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INTRODUCTION
The task of a court confronted with a choice of law
problem, conventionally conceived, is to determine which of
several different jurisdictions’ laws applies to the case before it.1
The question of what law applies is a question the court answers by
consulting the law of its own state; that is, it is a question of forum
choice-of-law doctrine. If the forum’s choice-of law rules direct
the application of forum law, the court proceeds to apply the
forum’s substantive, or internal law: the tort, contract, or other law
that determines the parties’ substantive rights.
The forum’s choice-of-law rules might also direct the
application of another state’s law. And at this point a question
arises. Should the court, when instructed by forum law to apply
the law of another state, apply that state’s internal law, or should it
apply the state’s entire law, including its choice-of-law rules? The
latter might seem the obvious choice—applying a state’s law, after
all, presumably means reaching the same results that the courts of
that state would reach—but it opens the door to an alarming
possibility. Suppose that State A’s law directs the application of
State B’s law, and the State A court understands this to mean the
entirety of State B law. If State B’s choice-of-law rules point back
to State A law, it is natural again to understand this as a reference
to the entirety of State A law, and an unending series of references
back and forth arises.2
The doctrine that a reference to the law of another state is a
reference to the entirety of that state’s law is the doctrine of renvoi,
1

Though renvoi arises in the international context, this Article will focus on
the domestic, interstate version, both to keep things as simple as possible and
because I will argue that the constitutional provisions governing interstate
relations significantly constrain states in the choice of law venture. For
international conflicts, the constitutional constraints are obviously lesser, but the
conceptual points I make retain significance.
2
Other descriptions of the repetition thus created abound: renvoi has been
called a “circulus inextricabilis,” John Pawley Bate, NOTES ON THE DOCTRINE
OF RENVOI IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1904); an “endless circle,”
Lindell Bates, Remission and Transmission in American Conflict of Laws, 16
Cornell L. Q. 311, 313 (1931), and “battledore and shuttlecock [or] international
lawn-tennis.” Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of
Foreign Law, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 190, 198 n.33 (1910).
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and the question of whether it should be followed—whether, in
choice-of-law terminology, the renvoi should be “accepted” or
“rejected”—stands out even among the notorious esoterica of
conflict of laws as unusually exotic and difficult.3 For over two
hundred years it has troubled the courts,4 driving judges to
distraction and scholars to treatises on deductive logic.5 Though
“[j]uristic speculation has been almost infinite,”6 scholarship has
not settled the matter; much of it “upon analysis, is seen to consist
of nothing but dogmatic statement of the result desired to be
reached.”7
In more recent years, the controversy has abated, as
scholars seem to have accepted the claim, put forward by
proponents of modern policy-oriented approaches to choice of law,
that these newer approaches offered a decisive answer.8 But the
claim is untrue and the problem persists.9 The solutions advanced
by the policy-oriented approaches are essentially the same as those

3

See, e.g., Joseph M. Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and
Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 249
(1941) (“famous, insidious, and baffling”). The matter of pronunciation presents
an additional difficulty: “rohn-vwa”? “ren-voy”? “ron-voy”? The first is
correct given the word’s French origin; those wishing to Anglicize (and after all,
no one calls the capital “Pah-ree”) use one of the latter two. See Larry Kramer,
Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 980 (1991).
4
See Ernst Otto Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American
Law, 31 HARV. L. REV. 523, 523, 523 (1917) (describing early renvoi cases).
5
For an example of the former, see, e.g., Matter of Tallmadge, 181
N.Y.Supp. 336 (Surr. Ct. 1919) (deploring the “fundamental unsoundness” of
the renvoi doctrine); for the latter, see, e.g., J.C. Hicks, The Liar Paradox in
Legal Reasoning, 29 Cam. L. J. 275, 284-89 (1971) (discussing renvoi in terms
of the theories of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead). I will have a
bit to say about the logical structure of the problem, though I do not, in the end,
think that approaching it from the perspective of formal logic is useful.
6
Note, A Distinction in the Renvoi Doctrine, 35 HARV. L. REV. 454, 454
(1922).
7
Joseph M. Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and
Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 249
(1941).
8
See infra Section II.B
9
See infra Section II.B. Kramer, supra note [], at 1003-1013, deserves
credit for the most penetrating and comprehensive statement of this point. My
account of why the modern approaches do not solve the renvoi problem is
similar to Kramer’s, but it adopts a slightly different perspective and relies in
part on constitutional considerations.
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offered by the traditionalists, and they suffer from the same
defects.10 Consequently, the dispute over renvoi should be a live
one.
At least, it should be a live one according to the
conventional understanding of the nature of the choice of law
process. My goal in this Article is not to take a side in the
dispute—not to argue that the renvoi should be accepted or
rejected. It is instead to shed some light on what kind of a problem
renvoi is, why it occurs, and what the problem might tell us about
the choice of law more generally.
In his 1938 assessment of the problem, Erwin Griswold
lamented that “we are apparently on a merry-go-round” and asked
“[h]ow is it possible to get off?”11 I want to ask a different
question: how did we get on in the first place? And my
conclusion, to end the suspense, is that certain conventional ways
of talking about choice of law have given us an unfortunate picture
of what a choice-of-law analysis involves.12
One of the
unfortunate things about this picture is that it is false, in perhaps
the only sense such a picture can be false, which is that its vision
of what courts are doing is unconstitutional. But more to the point,
the picture is unhelpful. It generates unnecessary difficulties; it
produces problems such as renvoi. Moving beyond that picture,
and conceptualizing conflicts in a different way, would help the
field a great deal, and this article is one in a series of attempts to
demonstrate that the persistent problems of the conventional
understanding are not inevitable.13
10

Kramer’s approach, though I do not agree with it in all particulars, is not
subject to the same criticisms. See infra Section II.B.
11
Erwin N. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1167
(1938).
12
See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 115
(1953) (“A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in
our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.”)
13
For my earlier attempt, see Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of
Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448 (1999). The broad purpose
of that article was to suggest that it would be more useful to talk in terms of
conflicts, rather than choices, between laws, because the rhetoric of choice
overstates the extent to which one state may disregard another state’s
determination that a transaction falls within the scope of its law. This article
addresses what is in some ways the converse of that problem: the extent to
which one state may disregard another’s determination that its law does not
reach a transaction. It focuses more broadly on the conventional understanding
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Part I of the Article sets out the renvoi problem as it is
conventionally understood. Part II examines the attempts to solve
it within particular choice-of-law systems: the traditional
approach14 and the more modern, policy-oriented approaches. It
suggests that these attempts are actually much more similar than
has previously been recognized, and that they fall prey to similar
difficulties. It also examines the current situation, in which
methodological pluralism obtains, and demonstrates that this
exacerbates the problem of renvoi. Part III sets out a different
approach to choice of law, building on a model developed by Larry
Kramer. Within this model, I show, the problem of renvoi appears
quite different; indeed, it does not exist. In place of the
interminable circle of references back and forth, there are several
narrow and distinct questions, none of which is insoluble or
paradoxical.
Part IV uses the model developed in Part III as an analytic
tool to examine the traditional and modern approaches to choice of
law and to gain a different perspective on the nature of renvoi
within those systems. And Part V offers the inevitable summation,
arguing that renvoi, like many other apparently intractable
problems in choice of law, is not a difficulty inherent to the
venture. Still less is it a logical puzzle to be tackled by appeals to
Russell and Whitehead. Instead, it is the artifact of a particular
conception of the choice-of-law process imposed upon on us by the
conventional vocabulary—specifically, the supposition that one
state’s law can determine whether another state’s law applies, and
more generally, the idea that a court’s task in performing a choiceof-law analysis is to decide which state’s law applies.
I.

THE PROBLEM

of choice of law as a matter of “determining what law applies” in the context of
renvoi; it also amplifies and refines some of the points of the earlier article.
And, I admit, it corrects a couple of mistakes.
14
In the interest of clarity, it is perhaps worth pointing out that I will be
using “the conventional understanding” and “the traditional approach” to refer to
two quite different things. The conventional understanding is the belief that the
task of a court faced with a choice-of-law issue is to determine what law applies.
The traditional approach is one method of doing so. The terminology may not
be pellucid, but I have been unable to improve it.
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Choice-of-law rules, at least on occasion, will direct the
application of some law other than the law of the forum. That,
after all, is the point of choice of law. When they do, the forum
court must decide what it means to apply the law of another state.
And this, as already noted, is the occasion at which the problem of
the renvoi arises. One of the earliest discussions of the problem
phrased the issue as follows: “Broadly stated, the doctrine of the
renvoi is that when, by its rules of the conflict of laws a court must
apply the law of some other legal unit, it must apply not only the
internal law of that unit, but also its rules of the conflict of laws.”15
Modern formulations are similar.16 The problem, of course, is that
each state’s choice-of-law rules might point to the law of the other
state, setting up a series of references back and forth, with no
obvious end in sight.
At the outset, there is something to be said about what kind
of a problem renvoi is. One answer is that it is a problem of selfreferentiality, conceptually linked to the welter of related
paradoxes arising from the simple proposition “This sentence is
false.”17 If we suppose that the question in a particular legal case
is whether the plaintiff should prevail, the renvoi could be modeled
as a situation in which State A’s law provides that the plaintiff
should prevail if she would prevail under the law of State B, while
State B’s law provides that the plaintiff should prevail if she would
under the law of State A.18 More precisely, the renvoi problem can
be compared to the circle created by the following two
propositions:

15

Note, A Distinction in the Renvoi Doctrine, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 454
(1921).
16
See, e.g., Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency
in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1196 (2000) (“when court X decides
that Y state law applies, should court X apply Y substantive law, or should it
apply Y choice-of-law rules”). The important aspect of this formulation, as will
become clear, is that it sees the application of state Y law as a question to be
determined by the state X court, under state X law.
17
See generally, e.g., G.H. Von Wright, PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 25-33
(1984) (discussing “the paradox of the liar”); Thomas A. Cowan, Renvoi Does
Not Involve a Logical Fallacy, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 34, 41-46 (1938) (comparing
renvoi to standard paradoxes of self-referentiality).
18
As I will suggest later, the renvoi problem appears in this form if one
adopts the local law theory. See infra [].
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P1: The following sentence is true.
P2: The preceding sentence is true.
These sentences do not create a paradox, as they would if
one asserted the falsity of the other. What they create is an
indeterminacy about their truth-values, a situation in which it
seems equally plausible to characterize them as both true, or both
false. If P1 is true, for example, then P2 must be true. And if P2 is
true, then P1 must be true. So this supposition simply leads to the
conclusion that both are true. What if P1 is false? Then P2 must
be false, in which case P1 must be false. Neither supposition leads
to a contradiction.
Likewise, we could suppose either that State A law
provides that the plaintiff prevails, or that she does not; either
supposition fits equally well. If State A law so provides, then B
law does as well; if A law does not, neither does B law. The
problem in this situation arises from the fact that there is no way to
put content—the substance of A or B law, the truth-values of P1 or
P2—into the circle, which means that a court would be unable to
reach a decision: A and B law, as defined, do not resolve the case.
One way of expressing this conclusion would be to say that when it
is impossible to decide whether a proposition is true or false, it is
quite likely that the proposition has not been defined sufficiently to
make it useful.19
From this perspective, renvoi appears as an incomplete
definition.20 It is also possible, however, to model renvoi in a way
19

Such an assertion is recognizable from the philosophical perspective. It
resembles the logical positivist claim that the meaning of a proposition is its
method of verification, which carries as a corollary the implication that
propositions that cannot be verified are meaningless. See, e.g., Moritz Schlick,
Positivism and Realism, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM 86-88 (A.J. Ayer, ed. & David
Rynin trans., 1959). It also holds a place in the legal canon. See Felix S.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functionalist Approach, 35 Colum. L.
Rev. 809, 826 (1935) (“All concepts that cannot be defined in terms of the
elements of actual experience are meaningless.”).
20
Erwin Griswold, in one of the leading articles, directs readers to a book
by Lewis and Langford. See Griswold, supra note [], at 1167 n.8 (citing LEWIS
& LANGFORD, SYMBOLIC LOGIC 438-85 (1932)). Those authors discuss the
paradox created by two sentences, each of which asserts the falsity of the other,
and term the situation thus created a “vicious regression” resulting from the fact
that “we have pretended to define p1 and p2 in terms of each other and therefore
have not assigned to them any meaning at all.” LEWIS & LANGFORD at 440.
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that produces paradox. Paradox arises when the truth values of the
propositions change as the cycle progresses.
In the oneproposition version (“This sentence is false”) the supposition that
the sentence is true implies that it is false, in which case it is true,
and so on. The two-proposition version is this:
P1: The following sentence is true
P2: The preceding sentence is false
Here, if we suppose that P1 is true, we can conclude that P2
is true, which implies that P1 is false. And if P1 is false, then P2
must be false, and hence P1 must be true. Renvoi resembles this
model if we suppose, as does the conventional approach to choice
of law, that the question to be answered is “What state’s law
applies?” Now name our propositions “State A law” and “State B
law” and define them as follows:
State A law: State B law applies
State B law: State A law applies
Now State A law tells us that State B law applies, but B law
tells us that A applies. The shifting answers to the question match
the fluctuating truth values of P1 and P2; here renvoi appears as a
paradox. The two states’ laws, with their mutual cross-reference,
in fact contradict each other. This depiction of renvoi is probably
closer to the conventional understanding than the incomplete
definition, and it captures something important about the problem:
the extent to which it relies on the supposition that State A law has
something to say about whether State B law applies to a
transaction. I will have occasion to discuss both versions, but the
paradox will be the primary focus.
So what kind of a problem is renvoi? From a logical
perspective, it is a problem of self-referentiality, which we could
call a paradox or an incomplete definition. Another answer, which
does more to explain the literature, is that it is a tempting problem.
It is severe, for it seems to prevent resolution of a case, but it is
easily stated, for everyone understands the idea of an endless cycle.
It is, by the standards of legal scholarship, sexy;21 it allows ready
21

Which, I admit, is not saying much.
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allusion to famous philosophical riddles, which possess—or seem
to—more intellectual gravitas than the latest iteration of the
Uniform Commercial Code. And it appears the sort of thing that
only someone very smart could figure out; there is about it a whiff
of Excalibur. It is, in short, exactly the type of problem that
problem-solving types like to solve.
The tempting nature of the problem is a partial explanation
for the academic furor that arose over renvoi in the first half of the
twentieth century. But renvoi was debated with such intensity in
the law reviews not simply because it is the sort of thing that
strikes legal scholars as nifty; it is also, legitimately, a serious issue
in the conflict of laws. When a carefully constructed system
throws up a paradox, it is at least a warning that something may be
amiss in the theory.22 It was not without reason that the problem
for many years “occupied the first rank in the theoretical
discussions relating to the Conflict of Laws.”23
Nor is renvoi’s significance merely theoretical; the renvoi
situation does arise in actual cases. The easiest way to create a
renvoi is through a difference in two states’ choice-of-law rules.
If, for instance, State A holds that the law to be applied to a tort is
the law of the place of injury, while State B holds that the
appropriate law is the law of the place of the act causing injury, a
tort with an act in A and an injury in B will bounce back and forth
between the two states. As Ernest Lorenzen, perhaps the renvoi’s
fiercest critic, noted, “The problem is a general one … It arises

22
In a logical system, the derivation of a paradox is catastrophic: because
any result can be logically derived from a paradox, all the conclusions generated
by the system become suspect. For a succinct example of the ways in which
self-referentiality can compromise the deductive soundness of a system,
consider the following two propositions:
P1: Both P1 and P2 are false.
P2: God exists.
P1 cannot be true, for then it would assert its own falsity, engendering
paradox. So P1 must be false. But then one of the two propositions must be
true, and the only remaining candidate is P2. Voila! This “proof” of the
existence of God is generally attributed to Buridan. [cite]
23
Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign
Law, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 190, 192 (1910). See also, e.g., 1 Ernst Rabel, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 75 (1958) (characterizing renvoi as “the most famous
dispute in conflicts law”).
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whenever the rules of Private International Law of the countries in
question differ.”24
In fact, Lorenzen understates the prevalence of renvoi,
which can arise, even when choice-of-law rules are identical, as a
consequence of differences in substantive law or characterization.25
Suppose, for example, that two states both follow the traditional
choice of law rule for contracts, according to which the validity of
a contract is determined by the law of the place of its formation.
Both additionally agree that a contract is formed in the place where
the last act necessary to formation occurs. They agree even that
acceptance is the crucial last act. Nonetheless, renvoi occurs if
they disagree on what constitutes acceptance. If, for instance,
State A follows the mailbox rule, under which a contract is formed
when acceptance is placed in the mail, and State B adheres to the
minority approach under which acceptance is effective only when
received, the two state’s laws will disagree about where the
contract was formed. And if acceptance was mailed in State B and
received in State A, the disagreement will take the form of a
renvoi: each state’s law will conclude that the contract was formed
in the other state and should be governed by that state’s law.26
Even substantive uniformity is not enough. Courts in states
that follow the same choice-of-law rules, whose substantive law is
in perfect accord, may still reach different conclusions about the
appropriate law to apply if they characterize a cause of action
24

Id. at 191.
See Rhoda Barish, Renvoi and the Modern Approaches to Choice of Law,
30 Am. U. L. Rev. 1049, 1064 (1981).
26
What if the rules are reversed, so that State B follows the mailbox rule
and A does not? Now each state’s law will see a contract formed within its
borders and subject to its law. Instead of the apparent mutual disclaimer of
legislative jurisdiction in the text, there are overlapping assertions of
jurisdiction—what conflicts literature calls a “cumul” or “conflit positif” instead
of a “lacune” or “conflit negative.” See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF
LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 138 (1993).
Juenger elsewhere seems to
suggest that the importation of the cumul and lacune into American conflicts law
was the responsibility of Brainerd Currie and that the traditional approach
avoided such problems. See Friedrich K. Juenger, How Do You Rate a
Century?, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 89, 105 (2001) (“Unlike Beale’s
territorialism . . . in Currie’s scheme of things, several states may be
simultaneously interested, or for that matter disinterested, in applying their
policies to a particular case”). As the foregoing demonstrates, similar results
can occur within the territorial system.
25
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differently. If one state’s courts see the case as presenting a tort
issue, and the other’s as a contract action, they may again each
conclude that the other state’s law applies.27
Likewise,
disagreement over the classification of an issue as substantive or
procedural can have the same effects, since courts will follow local
procedure even when applying foreign substantive law.28 To
eliminate the possibility of renvoi, in short, requires complete
uniformity in choice-of-law methodology, substantive law, and
characterization techniques—at which point, obviously, there is
very little need for choice of law. Renvoi, then, is aptly termed
one of the “pervasive problems”29 in choice of law; it will be with
us as long as courts consult choice-of-law rules to determine which
law applies.
One of the things this article aspires to do, of course, is to
undermine this conventional understanding of the choice-of-law
project. When we encounter paradox, it is worthwhile to pause
and think about whether what we have run into is a real difficulty,
or one of our own creation. I will eventually suggest that renvoi is
the latter. In order to understand the significance of that
conclusion, however, it is necessary first to consider how renvoi
looks from the perspective of the traditional and the more modern
approaches to choice of law, and to examine their attempts to solve
the problem.

27

Or, as mentioned in the previous note, each might conclude that its own
law applied. For a classic examples of the power of characterization, see, e.g.,
Levy v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A 163 (Ct. 1928)
(recharacterizing tort claim as contractual in nature). For discussions of
characterization more generally, see, e.g., Robertson, CHARACTERIZATION IN
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940). The scholarship on characterization has been,
if possible, less successful than conflicts generally; a leading casebook calls it
“large but uninformative.” DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY & LARRY
KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 45 (6th ed. 2001). I believe that characterization is
another area where the traditional choice of law vocabulary has led us astray and
that the problem is better understood as essentially an election of remedies
situation. Explaining and defending this assertion will require another article.
28
See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT
th
OF LAWS [] (4 ed. 2001).
29
WEINTRAUB, supra note [], at 52. Renvoi has also been classed with
“wrinkles in the theory,” see Lea Brilmayer & Jack Goldsmith CONFLICT OF
LAWS 119 (5th ed. 2002), and “problems old and new,” see Currie, Kay, &
Kramer, supra note [], at 244.
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II: RENVOI WITHIN SYSTEMS
A. The Traditional Approach
What is usually called the traditional (and sometimes the
territorial or vested rights) approach to choice of law was not as
monolithic as the label might suggest. Its preeminent exponents
differed in significant particulars, including their stance towards
renvoi.30 My exemplar will be Joseph Beale, who, as the Reporter
for the First Restatement and author of a three-volume treatise
commenting on the Restatement, exerted an unparalleled influence
on the development of American conflicts thought.
Beale’s approach begins with the axiom31 of territoriality,
the principle that “the law of a state prevails throughout its
30

Joseph Beale, as will be seen, took a fairly strong position against renvoi
as a matter of theory—though, as we shall also see, the logic of his position is
less than obvious. Goodrich’s hornbook, at least in its later editions, viewed it
more pragmatically and more favorably. See HERBERT F. GOODRICH,
GOODRICH ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 19-20 (3d ed. 1949) (“On policy grounds … a
better case for limited use of renvoi can be made”). (Goodrich’s move towards
pragmatism, and the evolution of conflicts thinking more generally, is neatly
encapsulated in way the various prefaces of his hornbook acknowledge Beale,
shifting from unadulterated praise in the first edition to the remark that “no
pioneer’s work becomes the last word in the subject and that is a good thing too”
in the third. See id. at v, ix.) And Dicey, describing the English practice, argued
that courts look to the entire law of foreign jurisdictions. See A. DICEY, A
DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
79-81, 715-23 (2d ed. 1908); see also Perry Dane, Vested Rights, ‘Vestedness,’
and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1191, 1199 n. 34 (1987) (noting disagreement
between Beale and Dicey).
31
“Axiom” is the appropriate word. Recent scholarship has suggested that
formalism, as conventionally understood, was more a creation of its critics than
an intellectual movement to which anyone actually subscribed. See, e.g.,
ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 57-106
(1998); Albert W. Altschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1
(1996). A look at Beale’s treatise, though, displays the extent to which he
believed his basic principles to be both unquestionable and capable of
generating fairly specific rules through a rational deductive process. See 1
BEALE § 1.14 at 12 (“In the introduction, the general nature of law, of legal
rights, and of jurisdiction will be considered; this will be followed by a detailed
theoretical study of legal rights, in which an attempt will be made to establish
the time and place in which legal rights come into existence, the legal effect of
acts, and the limits of merely remedial action”); id. § 3.4 at 25 (“[I]n great part
[law] consists in a homogeneous, scientific, and all-embracing body of
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boundaries and, generally speaking, not outside them.”32 Beale
believed it impossible, in fact, for the law of one state to operate as
law within the borders of another state: “It is quite obvious that
since the only law that can be applicable in a state is the law of that
state, no law of a foreign state can have there the force of law.”33
From this premise flows the conclusion that only the law of the
state where an event occurred can attach legal consequences to that
event, and choice of law becomes largely a matter of determining
the place of occurrence. Much of Beale’s treatise is therefore
concerned with establishing “localizing” rules to determine where,
for example, torts are committed or contracts formed.
Territoriality might seem to offer an easy answer to the
renvoi problem. If foreign law can never apply within the forum
state, then obviously the forum cannot apply foreign choice-of-law
rules. But this answer, as should be immediately apparent, comes
at the price of scuttling the whole choice-of-law venture: if the
forum can never apply foreign law, how is it to adjudicate cases
dealing with events that occurred in other states?
Beale’s answer was that when a court, for example,
awarded damages to a plaintiff for an out-of-state tort, it was not
applying the law of the foreign state as law at all. Instead, “[t]he
foreign law is a fact in the transaction.”34 That is, it is a fact that
foreign law entitles the plaintiff to recover, and this fact allows him
to invoke the remedial law of the forum. The forum applies its

principle”). Indeed, his treatise sets out choice-of-law rules with the certitude of
a logical demonstration. Given this understanding of law, the accusations of
dogmatism to which he was subjected are perhaps off the mark; no one calls a
logician dogmatic for believing in his proof. Beale’s failing was his belief that
law resembled logic. See Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral
Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1592 (2001) (noting
that Beale “came as close as anyone to understanding the common law as
composed of principles that transcended the actual principles upon which any
particular common law jurisdiction premised its decisions”).
32
1 BEALE, supra note [], § 59.1 at 308.
33
Id. § 5.4 at 53. For a contemporaneous discussion of territoriality, see
Elliott E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 379 (1945) (“Legal rights are created by the
operation of law on acts done in the territory within its jurisdiction, and only one
law can apply to an act.”).
For a modern one, see, e.g., Lea Brilmayer,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 11 (2d ed. 1995).
34
Ibid.
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own law in order to vindicate rights that have vested under the law
of another state.35
The advantage of this description over one that allows the
possibility of foreign law operating as law is not readily apparent
and may be a matter more of rhetoric than theory.36 Beale,
however, apparently believed that it offered a reason to reject the
renvoi. “The vice in the decisions [accepting renvoi],” he wrote,
“results from the assumption that the foreign law has legal force in
a decision of the case; whereas, as has been pointed out, the only
Conflict-of-Laws rule that can possibly be applied is the law of the
forum and the foreign law is called in simply for furnishing a
factual rule.”37
Why Beale thought the fact/law distinction solved the
problem is obscure at best. The question, phrased in Beale’s
terminology, is whether a court determining whether rights have
vested under foreign law should consult the entirety of foreign law,
or merely foreign internal law. Asserting that foreign law is “a fact
in the transaction” hardly shows that the latter is the correct course.
Indeed, the territorialist premise leads most naturally to the
opposite conclusion. If the forum is supposed to enforce rights
vested under foreign law, it should not be a matter of indifference
that the foreign court, following its choice of law rules, would
conclude that no rights exist under its law. As Erwin Griswold
observed, “It is not a little difficult to understand why the
exponents of the ‘vested rights’ point of view in conflict of laws
have also been leading opponents of the renvoi in any sense.”38

35

Id. § 8A.28 at 86. For a more detailed discussion of Beale’s taxonomy of
rights, see Roosevelt, supra note [], at 2456.
36
See Eliot E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their
Role and Utility, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 367 (1945) (suggesting that vested rights
theorists disapproved of the comity-based conception on the grounds that
speaking in terms of foreign law operating by permission of the forum would
“arouse suspicion” against “this foreign activity” and “give to the forum judge
the impression that his discretion is far wider than that given to the judge in
other fields of the law”).
37
1 BEALE, supra note [], § 7.3 at 56.
38
Griswold, supra note [], at 1187 and n.70. See also Note, supra, note [],
at 455 (arguing that when the forum “merely enforces a right created elsewhere”
“a just adjudication can be made only by deciding as to that right as the foreign
court would have decided”).
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Nor is Beale’s answer to the renvoi created by interstate
differences over the mailbox rule any more lucid. If different
states’ laws differ over where a contract was formed, he wrote, “In
a territorial system of law there can be little doubt that this conflict
is resolved in favor of the law of the forum.”39 Little doubt,
perhaps; little explanation, certainly. It is hard to avoid the
conclusion that Beale was motivated in part by the fact that
wholesale acceptance of the renvoi seems to lead nowhere. As he
put it, “we shall be inextricably involved in a circle and can never
decide the case, since each party will constantly refuse to apply its
own law and insist upon the law of the other party. This of course
is an impossible condition.”40
Beale was not alone; the traditionalists’ reaction to renvoi
in general consisted more of derision than analysis. Coudert called
it “a resultant of legal casuistry and over-subtlety … a doctrine
over-complicated, unsound and revolutionary,”41 and others have
termed it “heretic,” “puerile,” “paradoxical,” and “burlesque.”42
Renvoi’s unsoundness as matter of logic was frequently asserted to
be self-evident; as Lorenzen put it, the doctrine’s “days ought to be
few after its deceptive character is fully understood.”43 It is not
fanciful to hear a sense of betrayal in these words, and the reaction
is understandable. A logical system (what Beale and Lorenzen

39

1 BEALE, supra note [], § 7.1 at 55. Beale’s further explanation, in the
section of his treatise devoted specifically to the question of what law
determines the place of contracting, is disturbingly typical of his treatment of
difficult issues: “There is, indeed, no alternative.” 2 BEALE, supra note [], §
311.2 at 1046. Surprisingly, the Restatement finds one: it recommends
consulting “the general law of Contracts,” presumably meaning the general
common law. See Restatement, First, of Conflict of Laws § 311 note d.
40
Id. § 7.3 at 56.
41
Coudert, Some Considerations in the Law of Domicil, 36 Yale L. J. 949,
953 (1927).
42
See FRIEDRICH JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 78
(1993).
43
Ernest Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws—Meaning
of “The Law of a Country,” 27 Yale L. J. 509, 529 (1917). See also Ernest
Lorenzen, Renvoi in Divorce Proceedings Based Upon Constructive Service, 31
Yale L. J. 191, 192 (1921) (“A mere statement of the operation of the ‘renvoi
doctrine’ should be sufficient to condemn it.”); Ernst Otto Schreiber, The
Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 523, 570
(1917) (noting “insidious nature of the renvoi”).
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frequently referred to as a “science”44) that throws up a paradox
has indeed betrayed its creators and demonstrated a fundamental
untrustworthiness,45 and banishment is the only appropriate
response.46
But banishing a problem requires more than a refusal to
think about it. Renvoi is not a discrete axiom that can be excised
from a logical system; it is a consequence of a particular
understanding of the choice-of-law task. In contrast to the systembuilding logicians who encountered the paradoxes of set theory, 47

44

See, e.g., 1 BEALE, supra note [], § 3.4 at 25-26 (law “is not a mere
collection of arbitrary rules but a body of scientific principle”); Lorenzen, supra
note [] [columbia], at 204 (discussing “the science of the Private International
Law”). The proportion of vituperation to explanation prompted one scholar to
comment that “the present writer doubts whether [renvoi] has been surpassed by
any other topic in the law in the amount of material written upon it which, upon
analysis, is seen to consist of nothing but dogmatic statement of the result
desired to be reached.” Joseph M. Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization,
Localization and Preliminary Questions in the Conflict of Laws, 14 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 221, 249 (1941).
45
The untrustworthiness follows from the fact that a deductive system
containing a contradiction can prove any proposition. See supra note []
(proving the existence of God). In addition to the sense of betrayal, there may
have been a bit of xenophobia at work as well; the characterizations of renvoi as
insidious and over-subtle might be summarized by calling it too French, and
Cheshire explicitly argued that it was undesirable to attempt to follow
continental conflicts law because European courts did not even adhere to stare
decisis, making it difficult to ascertain their law. See Griswold, supra note [], at
1179.
46
The First Restatement, explaining that “the only Conflict of Laws used in
the determination of the case is the Conflict of Laws of the forum,” provided
that “the foreign law to be applied is the law applicable to the matter in hand and
not the Conflict of Laws of the foreign state.” Restatement, First, of Conflict of
Laws § 7. Section 8, with less explanation, provided two exceptions to this
general rule: cases involving “title to land” and “the validity of a decree of
divorce” were to be decided in accordance with the law of the situs or the
parties’ domicil “including the Conflict of Laws rules of that state.” Id. § 8.
47
My reference to the system builders is intended primarily to include those
engaged in the logicist project of deriving arithmetic from first-order logic, i.e.,
Gottlob Frege, and the team of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead.
Russell was responsible for the collapse of Frege’s attempt, pointing out that a
version of the liar paradox could be generated by one of Frege’s axioms. See
generally Ray Monk, BERTRAND RUSSELL: THE SPIRIT OF SOLITUDE 142-44,
152-54 (1996) (describing Russell and Whitehead’s project and Russell’s
interaction with Frege); W.T. Jones, 5 A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
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the traditionalists responding to renvoi did not attempt to adjust
their basic postulates.48 Instead, they simply vilified the
consequence, focusing their attention on symptoms rather than root
causes.
Supposing that legal theories and thought should conform
to the standards of logic or science is, of course, part of the error
traditionally ascribed to the formalists, so there is some irony in
faulting them for not adhering to those standards. Demanding that
law adopt the methodology of science is part of the project of legal
realism, which also had a scientific conception of law, though a
different conception of science.49 The difference is that the
formalists are generally associated with a belief in the autonomy of
law, the existence of a distinctly legal style of reasoning, while the
realists attempted to assimilate it to scientific empiricism more
generally.50
My object in this article is not to argue for (or against)
either of these conceptions. It is rather to take different approaches
to choice of law seriously on their own terms, to consider how they
deal with renvoi, and whether we could do better. Given that the
traditional approach does aspire to a high degree of theoretical
coherence—consider Beale’s disdain for those who believed law
was “a mere collection of arbitrary rules”51—whether it can handle
renvoi in a principled manner is an important test.
The

160-65 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing Russell’s attempt to overcome the paradox via
the Theory of Types).
48
Dicey’s treatise did eventually abandon its reliance on the idea of vested
rights, which has some palliative effect. See John Swan, Federalism and the
Conflict of Laws: The Curious Position of the Supreme Court of Canada, 46
S.C. L. Rev. 923, 948-49 (1995). The correct response, I will suggest, is to give
up on the idea that State A law can prescribe that State B law “applies.” See
infra [].
49
See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict
of Laws 3-5 (1942) (favoring induction over deduction, endorsing scientific
methodology).
50
See, e.g., Morton Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 199 (1992) (describing
formalists as seeking “to represent legal reasoning as fundamentally different
from political or moral reasoning”); Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism:
Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 115, 129
(2003) (characterizing realists as seeking “to build a new, post-formalist
‘science’ of law”).
51
1 BEALE, supra note [], § 3.4 at 25-26
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traditionalists did not provide a good answer, but the question
remains whether they could have.
Conceptually, the basic problem the traditionalists
encountered was that they lacked an explanation of why courts
should disregard foreign choice of law rules after having decided
to apply foreign law. (Or, in a slightly different phrasing, why
foreign choice-of-law rules should be treated differently from
foreign internal law.) The problem was especially acute for
Beale’s vested rights theory, for the idea that the forum’s task is to
enforce rights acquired under foreign law is hard to square with the
practice of reaching results different from those the foreign court
would reach: in such cases the forum is enforcing rights whose
existence the foreign court would deny.52
The traditionalists tended to rely on the observation that
once the renvoi is accepted, there is no logical stopping point; the
rest is mostly bluster.53 The traditionalist rejection of renvoi is
consequently unconvincing, for contumely is not argument.54
Arguments exist, however. Within the conventional understanding
of the choice of law venture, there are three basic conceptual
moves to make in response to the problem of renvoi, three
arguments to bolster the forum’s authority and justify its disregard
for foreign choice of law rules and the results that would be
reached by foreign courts. These moves were available to the
52

This point was raised against the traditionalists but “never adequately
answered, and by Professor Beale not at all.” David F Cavers, THE CHOICE OF
LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 1933-1983 40 (1985). See, e.g., Cheatham, supra note
[], at 380 (“When the renvoi element is rejected and F employs the X internal
law to determine the rights of the parties, it cannot be said that F is enforcing an
X-created right, for the only legal right the party could have enforced in an X
court was based on the internal law of the other state, Y”); Griswold, supra note
[], at 1187 (“a reference to a foreign law means that the local court should reach
the conclusion which the foreign court would reach on the same facts”).
53
Lorenzen asserted that courts could not accept renvoi because “upon strict
principles of logic it can lead to no solution of the problem. … There would
appear to be no escape in legal theory from this circle or endless chain of
references.” Lorenzen, supra note [], at 197-98. Beale characteristically
invoked impossibility: “[We] shall be inextricably involved in a circle and can
never decide the case, since each party will constantly refuse to apply its own
law and insist upon the law of the other party. This of course is an impossible
condition.” 1 Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7.3, 56 (1935).
54
Or as Tom Stoppard put it, “A gibe is not a rebuttal.” Tom Stoppard,
Arcadia 37 (1993).
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traditionalists, and some of them were used. They remain
available to modern theorists, and again, some have been invoked.
In the end, however, none succeeds.
My purpose in assessing these resources is twofold. First, I
intend to show that the problem of renvoi has not been resolved.
Second, I want to highlight the point that there are conceptual
similarities in the way that different systems have tried to deal with
the problem. Succeeding generations of conflicts theory have
made, or could make, the same small number of moves to deal
with renvoi, none of which is ultimately successful. And
eventually I want to suggest that the reason the different systems
have such similar responses is that the problem comes from
something they have in common: the supposition that forum law
has something to say about the application of foreign law. That
suggestion, of course, is for a later section.
1. The Inherent Distinctiveness of Choice of Law
The initial reason a traditionalist might give for ignoring
the foreign state’s choice of law rules is that the distinction
between foreign internal law and foreign choice of law inheres in
the vested rights approach. The aim is to enforce the rights that
vest under foreign substantive law, and therefore it is substantive
law that should be consulted. Choice-of-law rules, a traditionalist
might say, are directed to courts and not parties; they have nothing
to do with substantive rights.55
This move has some superficial appeal, but it is in fact
unfaithful to the methodology it invokes. For a territorialist, the
choice-of-law calculus identifies the jurisdiction with authority to
regulate a particular transaction. (It is for that reason that
territorialism is called a jurisdiction-selecting approach.) The
55

Interestingly, the assertion of inherent distinctiveness is essentially the
tack taken by the most sustained attempts to resolve the renvoi problem by
application of formal logic. See Cowan, supra note [], at [] (invoking Russell
and Whitehead’s theory of types as justification for ignoring foreign choice-oflaw rules); Hicks, supra note [], at [] (same). As the text demonstrates, the same
move can be made without invoking Russell and Whitehead, which suggests that
tacking on a philosophical pedigree adds little. Moreover, focusing on the
logical aspect of the problem detaches it from the context of choice of law and
obscures the extent to which legal analysis can tell us something about which
solutions are plausible and which are not.
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jurisdiction thus identified is the only one whose laws attach legal
consequences to the transaction.56 The foreign state’s conclusion
that its law does not apply, then, is, according to the internal logic
of the vested rights approach, tantamount to a conclusion that no
rights have vested under its law. That is, the traditional approach
takes choice of law rules as deeply relevant to the question of what
rights the parties possess. It is no answer, then, to say that
territorialism is concerned with vested rights and not choice-of-law
rules, for choice-of-law rules determine where and whether rights
vest.
2. The Appeal to Objectivity
If foreign choice-of-law rules cannot be simply ignored as
irrelevant to the forum’s analysis, the next plausible tack is to
assert that the foreign state’s choice of law rules can be rejected
because they are, in some sense, incorrect.57 I call this move the
appeal to objectivity because it asserts, in defiance of the
contemporary methodological pluralism, that there is some
objective standard (usually resembling forum law) against which
foreign choice-of-law rules can be measured. In fact, the move
defies more than the state of modern conflicts law, for it runs
against one of the most basic principles of contemporary
jurisprudence, the principle that state courts are authoritative in the
exposition of their own law.

56
See 1 Beale, supra note [], at 46 (“By its very nature law must apply to
everything and must exclusively apply to everything within the boundary of its
jurisdiction.”).
57
A slightly more subtle way of making the argument might characterize
renvoi as a conflict between choice-of-law rules, requiring resolution in the
same way as a conflict between internal laws. The rejection of renvoi, then,
would be seen as a determination that forum choice-of-law rules should prevail
if they conflict with foreign rules, not because the foreign rules are objectively
wrong but simply because a choice must be made. See Herma Hill Kay, “The
Entrails of a Goat”: Reflections on Reading Lea Brilmayer’s Hague Lectures,
48 Mercer L. Rev. 891, 914 (1997) (stating that “the situation poses a conflict of
conflict of laws rules”). This approach does not avoid the problems I identify;
rather, it highlights them, because it asserts so clearly that whether foreign law
applies is a question to be answered by reference to forum law. This assertion is
what I identify as the fundamental source of the renvoi problem. See infra [].
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That principle, however, is of relatively recent vintage, and
the traditionalists had available a very effective argument for the
appeal to objectivity. It is not clear to me whether they actually
made the argument. Larry Kramer, who does present it, attributes
it to Beale, but this is perhaps overgenerous; Beale’s analysis of
renvoi, as discussed earlier, turns on the law/fact distinction.58 The
stronger argument relies not on that distinction, but on the status of
Conflicts as part of the general common law.
Beale’s treatise recognizes several different kinds of law.
“Theoretical law,” for instance, he defined as “the body of
principles worked out by the light of reason and by general usage,
without special reference to the law in any particular state.”59
“Positive law,” by contrast, is “the law as actually administered in
a particular country.”60 Last, in some ways intermediate between
the positive and the theoretical law, is what Beale referred to as the
“general common law,” an unwritten body of law “which is
accepted by all so-called common law jurisdictions but is the
particular and peculiar law of none.”61 The doctrines of the
common law, Beale wrote, “are authoritative in each state whose
law is based upon it; and the decision of courts of all such states
are important evidences of the law.”62
For Beale, then, the general common law, which included
conflict of laws, existed independent of any particular state or
lawmaking authority. It was common to, and authoritative in,
every common law jurisdiction, whose courts struggled to discern
it, but it had no single source, and hence no single authoritative
interpreter. And thus a forum court could—indeed, might well be
required to by the binding precedents of the forum’s higher
courts—conclude that foreign courts had erred in their articulation
or application of choice-of-law rules. Making choice of law part of
the general common law essentially imposes uniformity on the
forum and foreign courts, while simultaneously granting them
interpretive independence with regard to the content of the uniform

58

See Kramer, supra note [], at 985-87.
See 1 Beale, supra note [], § 1.12 at 9.
60
Id. § 1.12 at 10.
61
Id. § 4.1 at 27.
62
Id. § 1.12 at 10.
59

21

ROOSEVELT

2004

7/13/2004

Resolving Renvoi

22

law. This move goes some way towards eliminating the problem
of the renvoi.63
This approach, of course, relies on Beale’s understanding
of the general common law as controlling in common law
jurisdictions but lacking a single supreme interpreter. It was, we
could say, authoritative law without an author.64 Beale did not
dispute that state courts are the authoritative expositors of their
own law; he relied on the point that the general common law is no
state’s own law. The decisions of state courts applying common
law produced the positive law of the state, and lower state courts
were bound by the decisions of higher state courts as to the content
of that law. But they were bound by virtue of their inferior status,
not because state supreme courts had any power to make the
common law of the state. Indeed, Beale rejected the proposition
that courts make law, explicitly and at length.65 It was for this
reason that courts of other jurisdictions, not subject to the state
hierarchy, were entitled to interpretive independence.
It is not clear to me, I have said, that the traditionalists ever
made the argument for objectivity based on the general common
law. Neither, however, is it necessary to decide whether they did;
what is important is to see that the argument is ultimately
unavailing. A first problem with this resolution of the renvoi
problem is that it is somewhat too powerful. Choice-of-law rules
are part of the general common law, but so too is the large portion
of tort and contract law that has not been codified. Beale’s theory
63

Not all the way, and not as far as might seem at first blush, because
renvoi can arise even with uniform choice-of-law rules. See supra []. In
addition, the “uniformity” produced by the appeal to objectivity is illusory in
practice, because the foreign courts will almost certainly continue to apply their
own interpretations of the general common law and disregard those of the
forum.
64
The best modern analog is probably something like the Restatements.
We could imagine a situation in which the courts of several states announced
that they would follow a Restatement while differing over what the relevant
Restatement section meant. In applying Massachusetts law, a New York court
would nowadays follow the Massachusetts decisions construing the
Restatement; under the analog to Beale’s approach, it would instead follow
those of New York.
65
See 1 Beale, supra note [], § 3.4 at 24 (“Courts are sworn to enforce the
law, not to make it); § 4.6 at 39 (stating that the possibility of “a difference of
opinion between the state court and the federal court sitting in the state as to the
law of the state” “is quite incompatible with the court making the law”).
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of the general common law did not distinguish between choice of
law and substantive law, and it suggested that the forum court
should follow its own interpretation of substantive general law as
well. That is, if the tort law of the forum differs from that of the
foreign state, the forum should apply its own law, since that
represents the forum’s best understanding of the general common
law that prevails in the foreign state and the forum alike. The
appeal to general law, in short, tends to obliterate the whole idea of
choice of law.
The elimination of choice of law is not a fatal defect.
Indeed, it may not be a defect at all; this article will end with a
prescription that could be construed as calling for much the same
thing.66 The more serious problem with the appeal to general law
is not that it accomplishes too much, but rather that from the
modern perspective it accomplishes nothing at all.
The regime under which a forum will apply its own
understanding of general law rather than the understanding of the
geographically appropriate state court is familiar to students of
legal history. It is the regime of Swift v. Tyson,67 which the
positivists, Oliver Wendell Holmes notably among them, attacked,
and which the Supreme Court rejected in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins.68 And that is the second, and more devastating,
objection to the appeal to general law: we have it on good authority
that there is no such thing.
To reduce Erie to the proposition that the general law does
not exist is, of course, to engage in caricature. What Erie stands

66
Not, I hasten to add, by imposing the uniformity of a general law upon
every state. See infra [].
67
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Beale relied on Swift at a number of points,
see. e.g., 1 Beale, supra note [], § 3.3 at 22 & n.1; § 3.5 at 26; § 4.6 at 39 & n.1,
and, looking at the cases on which Beale constructed his system, one might
think he had a rare knack for picking losers. In addition to Swift, he favored
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), which hung on until 1945 and
International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See 1 Beale,
supra note [], § 42.2 at 276 (citing Pennoyer). A more accurate statement would
be that Beale had the misfortune that his great work was one of the last
flowerings of legal classicism, a worldview soon to be swept aside. See
generally Horwitz, supra note [], at 9-31 (describing classical legal thought);
William M. Wiecek, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW
AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998) (same).
68
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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for is a complicated and contested question.69 Some of its
language might suggest that its relevance for state courts, my chief
focus, is marginal at best. To the extent that Erie relies on the
idea that making general common law is beyond the power of the
federal government entirely, and a fortiori beyond the power of
federal courts, it might seem not to apply to state courts at all.70
But it also seems to hold (though the constitutional source for this
proposition is unclear) that state high court decisions are of equal
dignity with state statutes.71 If that is so, the Full Faith and Credit
clause would presumably bar state courts from refusing to follow
the high courts of other states when applying those states’ law.72
69

For a sampling of the literature, see, e.g., EDWARD A PURCELL, JR.,
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER,
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(2000); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of
Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 Tex. L. Rev.
79 (1993); Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States:
Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U.Pa. L. Rev. 1459 (1997);
John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1974);
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964); Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the
Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 Va. L. Rev. 673 (1998); Larry Kramer, The
Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263, 283 (1992);
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 395, 426-38 (1995); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on
Erie—The Thread, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1682 (1974); Louise Weinberg, Federal
Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 805 (1989).
70
See id. at 78 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a state … [a]nd no clause in the Constitution purports
to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”).
71
See id. at 79 (“’The common law so far as it is enforced in a State,
whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law
of that State existing by the authority of that State … . The authority and only
authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own
(whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court) should utter the last
word.’”) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533-35 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
72
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 731 (1988) (stating that
construction that “contradict[s] law of the other State that is clearly established
and has been brought to the court’s attention” violates Full Faith and Credit).
Erie is often cited for the proposition that state courts are authoritative with
respect to their own law. That is a misconception; Erie did not establish this
proposition but simply increased the significance of what was already accepted
by expanding the range of issues governed by state (rather than general) law.
For a discussion of the early treatment by the Supreme Court of state-court

24

ROOSEVELT

7/13/2004

Resolving Renvoi

2004

25

Nor, of course, do states have the power to make law for other
states.73 Thus, at the least, Erie establishes that state courts’
authority with respect to the interpretation of their own law cannot
be circumvented by the suggestion that conflicts is in some sense
not state law.
3.

The Local Law Theory

So foreign choice of law rules cannot be ignored, and they
cannot be overridden on the grounds that they are part of a general
law that the foreign courts have misunderstood. One more means
exists to bring the matter back within the authority of the forum: to
assert that the law being applied is, in some sense, “really” forum
law.
This move occupies a prominent place in the literature; it is
what is known as the “local law theory.” It was presented most
completely by a critic of the traditionalists, Walter Wheeler Cook,
and it begins with a point already noted, that a true adherent of the
vested rights approach would consult foreign choice of law rules in
order to determine whether rights had vested under foreign law.74
But rather than adhering to the vested rights theory and urging
acceptance of the renvoi, Cook argued that the widespread failure
to do so implied that courts, whatever they said, were doing
something other than enforcing vested rights.75 In fact, Cook

interpretations of state law, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the
Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44
Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1388 & n.70 (1992).
73
See, e.g., Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) (“No State
can legislate except with respect to its own jurisdiction”). Bonaparte is
admittedly from the territorialist era, but the Supreme Court appears to believe it
has continuing vitality. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571
(1996).
74
Courts applying Beale’s approach, Cook argued, “are logically compelled
… to study the decision of [foreign] courts … upon the conflict of laws … .”
WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 19 (1942).
75
As Cheatham put it, citing Cook, “When the renvoi element is rejected
and F employs the X internal law to determine the rights of the parties, it cannot
be said that F is enforcing an X-created right, for the only legal right the party
could have enforced in an X court was based on the internal law of the other
state, Y.” Cheatham, supra note [], at 380. See also, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, A
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argued, courts were applying “the rule of decision which the given
foreign state or country would apply, not to this very group of facts
now before the court of the forum, but to a similar but purely
domestic group of facts involving for the foreign court no foreign
element.”76 In consequence, Cook concluded, “[t]he forum thus
enforces not a foreign right but a right created by its own law.”77
Is this a distinction without a difference? Some have
concluded that the local law theory amounts to little more than
hand-waving. Hessel Yntema called it “empty luggage,”78 and
David Cavers offered an anecdotal analogy that is no less
devastating for its humor.
Theories that explain how it is that a foreign rule isn’t
foreign law when it is used in deciding a case in another
country might seem more useful if I could forget the
way in which my son resolved a like problem when, at
the age of four, he encountered tuna fish salad. “Isn’t
that chicken?” he inquired after the first bite. Told that

Defense of Currie’s Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 Recueil des Cours 19,
31 (1989) (describing Cook’s argument).
76
Cook, supra note [], at 21.
77
Ibid. Although the local law theory is generally associated with Cook, it
was prominent in the literature before his work. See, e.g., Lorenzen, supra note
[Columbia], at 206: (“It follows that whenever the question as to the creation of
rights under the law of a foreign country arises before the tribunals of another
State the existence or non-existence of such rights depends, properly speaking,
not upon the will of the foreign law-giver, but upon the lex fori, which must be
deemed to have adopted the foreign internal or territorial law for the purpose.”);
Schreiber, supra note [], at 531 (“The truth is that the [forum] is enforcing its
own law throughout, and is not in any sense enforcing [foreign] law.”) Beale of
course maintained a similar position as a matter of metaphysics: because he
believed that foreign law could be given effect only as a fact, the law the forum
applied as law must be local law. Under his approach, “the foreign law cannot
and does not operate in the forum but … a foreign-created right or obligation is
enforced.” Cheatham, supra note [], at 365-66. Cook was concerned with
pointing out the inconsistency between Beale’s theory and the traditionalist
practice of rejecting the renvoi and thus enforcing “rights” whose existence the
foreign court would deny, an inconsistency that Beale’s fact/law distinction does
not resolve.
78
Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2
Am. J. Comp. L. 297, 316 (1953); see also, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, How Do
You Rate a Century, 37 Willamette L. Rev. 89, 102 (2001) (stating that “[i]t may
well be doubted whether anything is gained” by the local law theory).
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no, indeed, it was fish, he restored his world to order
and concluded the matter by remarking to himself,
“Fish made of chicken.”79
The theory continues to have its adherents, however; one
does not have to look far to find those who maintain that “[i]n
reality, a state can only create and apply its own law.”80 In a less
ambitious form, the theory is hard to deny; that a forum will
sometimes apply a “rule of assimilation” and shape its law to
mirror the substance of foreign internal law is an important
insight.81 And, most relevant for the purposes of this article, the
local law theory does have the ability to resolve the renvoi
problem. Unfortunately, the solution comes at a price that no
choice of law theory can accept.
To see these points, the first step is the realization that the
assertion that the forum is enforcing local law, by itself, does
nothing. The question remains whether local law is to be shaped to
resemble the entirety of foreign law, or foreign internal law alone.
The two possible answers to this question give rise to what Cavers
famously called “the two ‘local law’ theories.”82
The first, which Cavers associated with Judge Learned
Hand, “requires … that a right be found to have been created in
whatever state is selected by the forum’s choice-of-law rule.”83
That is, under the first local law theory, local law mimics the
entirety of foreign law. Under the second, which Cavers attributed
to Cook, local law mimics only the foreign state’s internal law, and

79

David Cavers, THE CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1933-1983, 4647 (1985).
80
Stanley E. Cox, Razing Conflicts Facades to Build Better Jurisdiction
Theory: The Foundation—There is no Law but Forum Law, 28 Val. U. L. Rev.
1, 3 (1993); see also Harold Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic
Look at Choice of Law, 44 VAND. L. REV. 827, 842-43 (1991) (“If the decision
is the law in the case, then in this sense forum law is always applied, even
though the forum may look to foreign rules or principles to find guides for its
decision.”).
81
See Dane, supra note [], at []; see generally infra Section [] (discussing
assimilation).
82
See David Cavers, The Two “Local Law” Theories, in THE CHOICE OF
LAW, SELECTED ESSAYS, 1933-1983 45-57 (1985).
83
Id. at 48.
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thus “it is a matter of no concern whether the foreign state has
created a right in the plaintiff under its law.”84
The difference between the two theories assumes
significance when the foreign state’s entire law does not create a
right—that is, when its choice-of-law rules do not select its own
law. This circumstance, of course, is the renvoi. Hand’s version
of the local law theory does not solve the renvoi problem, for
mimicking the entirety of foreign law will lead the forum to apply
the foreign state’s choice-of-law rules, even if as a matter of
“forum” law.85 Thus a State A court may well find itself in a
situation in which State A law provides that the plaintiff shall have
whatever rights she would have under State B law, and State B law
gives her whatever rights she would have under State A law. That
is, Hand’s version of the local law theory simply restates the
problem of renvoi from the perspective that sees it as an
incomplete definition.86
For the local law theory to deal with renvoi, then, it must be
understood as directing local law to mimic only foreign internal
law and thus not concerning itself with whether a foreign court
would agree that the rights being enforced exist. This is Cook’s
version of the theory, and while it does indeed allow a court to
overcome the renvoi, it comes with its own set of problems.
The first problem is that Cook’s version of the local law
theory seems to be very little more than an alternate description of
rejecting the renvoi. It solves the problem, but it does so by fiat,
with no explanation of why forum law should mimic foreign
internal law but not foreign choice-of-law rules. Cook would
likely not have been troubled by this. He offered the local law
theory more as a description of what courts were doing than an
explanation, and his purpose was to show that the vested rights
theory did not fit the practice. But an approach so lacking in
normative or explanatory force is unlikely to win many
adherents.87
84

Ibid.
Beale’s vested rights approach is basically similar to the Hand
formulation, and it is for basically the same reason that his admonition to reject
the renvoi is suspect. See supra [discussing Beale]
86
See supra [] (discussing renvoi as incomplete definition).
87
As Cheatham put it, “[t]he wisdom of substituting for the territoriality of
the place of occurrence a conceptually necessary territoriality of the state of the
85
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In fact, there is a more substantial reason that the local law
theory is unsatisfactory: it raises serious constitutional difficulties.
The current Supreme Court has adopted quite a lenient reading of
the constitutional strictures on choice-of-law rules, but it has
repeatedly affirmed that such limits exist.88 In particular, the Due
Process Clause prohibits states from applying their own law unless
they have certain minimum contacts with the litigated
transaction.89 There are certainly circumstances in which the
forum will lack the required contacts, but the local law theory
insists that it nonetheless apply its own law, in apparent defiance of
Due Process requirements.
This objection might seem sophistic, the same sort of handwaving as critics deemed the local law theory itself—but worse,
because the hand-waving here is employed not to solve a problem
but to create one. After all, the “local law” that is applied is not in
substance forum internal law; it is the internal law of some other
state. The state whose internal law is mimicked will almost
certainly have sufficient contacts with the case for the application
of its law to be constitutionally acceptable. If it does not, at any
rate, the defect will lie in the choice-of-law rule that selected that
state’s law, not the local law theory. And so, one might think, the
Due Process problem is at most a technicality. Since the forum
could constitutionally apply the foreign law in its own right, there
is certainly no injury from the application of forum law modeled
on foreign law.90
But the objection is somewhat more serious than that,
because Cook’s version of the local law theory—unlike Hand’s—
does more than simply slap the label “local law” on foreign law. It
changes the contours of foreign law in a very real sense—it
identifies and enforces rights that do not exist under the foreign

forum cannot find adequate support in any supposedly necessary notion about
the nature of law. Any analytical system, as Mr. Cook would have been the first
to insist, is useful only in aiding us to see and express the real problem.”
Cheatham, supra note [], at 388.
88
For a critical evaluation of the Court’s constitutional choice-of-law
jurisprudence, see Roosevelt, supra note [] at [].
89
See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985) (discussing
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit restrictions).
90
See id. at 816 (noting that “there could be no injury” if the law applied by
the forum did not conflict with any other law that might be applied).
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law.91 What it applies may be local law only in name, but it is not,
in substance, foreign law.92
The practical purpose of Due Process restrictions on choice
of law is to protect litigants from unfair surprise, paradigmatically
the imposition of liability that they had no reason to expect. From
this perspective, the local law theory is troubling; it imposes
liability that does not exist under the law of the state selected by
forum choice-of-law rules. It will do so in every case in which the
renvoi issue exists—which are the only cases in which it actually
does any work.
Suppose, for instance, that New York and Pennsylvania
both follow a territorialist approach, and a defendant injures a
plaintiff in New York. Obviously, if the defendant is somehow
sued in Hawaii, the application of Hawaii law will raise Due
Process issues, at least in a formal sense. It will be a formal sense
alone—and a mindless formalism, at that—if Hawaii uses the local
law theory to supplement a territorialist approach and mimics New
York law. There can be no Due Process objection to the
application of New York law; that law clearly asserts an intent to
regulate the defendant’s conduct and he cannot claim unfair

91

This assertion might seem to beg the question—is it so clear that no rights
exist under a state’s law if its choice of law rules point elsewhere? I will argue
that the answer is generally yes, but the argument will have to be deferred. See
infra [] [redescription, Klaxon discussion]. At this point I will rest with the
observation that Cavers thought so. See Cavers, supra note [], at 49 (arguing
that determining whether a right had been created under X law “would require a
reference, not merely to the X substantive law, but to the X choice-of-law rules.
Only if they [pointed] to the X law as applicable to this very case could one say
that a right had been created by X law.”). Cook agreed; that was why he saw the
local law theory as a critique of Beale’s vested rights account. See Cook, supra
note [], at 32 (arguing that a forum can claim to be enforcing a foreign right only
if it has “acted precisely as the [foreign] officials would have acted had the
precise case been presented to them”) (emphasis in original).
92
Again, this is a little question-begging, and again, I will have to postpone
a fuller discussion of the issue. See infra [Klaxon analysis]. For now, note that
it is a commonplace of our system that state courts are authoritative in the
exposition of their own law, and thus if the State X high court would assert that
the plaintiff has no rights under State X law, it is at least superficially plausible
to take that as the end of the matter. As Griswold put it, “a reference to a
foreign law means that the local court should reach the conclusion which the
foreign court would reach on the same facts.” 1187
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surprise in being subjected to the law that would be applied by the
courts of the state where he acted.
In that case, however, no renvoi problem exists either, and
the local law theory is idling. New York choice-of-law rules direct
the application of New York law, so a Hawaii court could achieve
the same result by applying New York law qua New York law,
rather than mimicking New York internal law. The theory does do
some work if we imagine that Hawaii choice-of-law rules instead
lead a Hawaii court to suppose that Pennsylvania law is
appropriate.93 Saying that the law applied is Hawaii law shaped to
resemble Pennsylvania internal law explains why the Hawaii court
can ignore Pennsylvania territorialist choice-of-law rules, so here
we see the local law theory working to explain rejection of the
renvoi. But new problems are created: now the defendant has
effectively been subjected to a law that, according to its
authoritative expositors, the Pennsylvania courts, does not reach
his conduct.
In this hypothetical case, the Due Process objection has
more force. The conventional Due Process analysis would look to
the connections between Pennsylvania and the litigated transaction,
and conclude that the parties’ domicile creates a sufficient
connection to make it legitimate for Pennsylvania to exercise
legislative jurisdiction.94 This makes sense as far as it goes. It
makes sense as a test for when a Pennsylvania court should be
permitted to apply Pennsylvania law. And it makes sense as a test
for when a Hawaii court can apply Pennsylvania law, if a
Pennsylvania court would have applied Pennsylvania law. But in
the imagined case, it makes no sense at all, because the test is
designed to determine whether Pennsylvania may exercise
legislative jurisdiction, and on the supposed facts, Pennsylvania
has not attempted to do so. Pennsylvania law, as interpreted by

93

The most plausible way in which this might occur would be if Hawaii
were an interest analysis state and both parties were from Pennsylvania.
Because I am currently discussing the traditional approach, we can suppose
instead that Hawaii law for some reason finds the last act occurring in
Pennsylvania. Such a reason, I admit, is hard to imagine, but the analysis does
not depend on its plausibility.
94
See generally Shutts, supra note [], at 818-19; Brilmayer, supra note
[treatise], § 3.2.2 at 137-143 (discussing Due Process analysis).
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Pennsylvania courts, is territorial in scope and attaches no legal
consequences to the defendant’s conduct.95
One way of phrasing the practical Due Process objection,
then, is to say that it is indeed surprising to be subjected to a law
that does not reach your conduct. Another, which I prefer, is to say
that in such a case Hawaii is not applying Pennsylvania law in any
meaningful sense.96 The defendant’s claim of unfair surprise at the
imposition of liability under Hawaii law goes beyond formalism,
for the Hawaii court has created an obligation that simply does not
exist under Pennsylvania law and would not be recognized by
Pennsylvania courts.97
From a more theoretical perspective, the Due Process issue
is the permissible scope of state legislative jurisdiction.98 From
this perspective, the local law theory appears even worse, asserting
a legislative jurisdiction that is entirely unbounded: a state’s law
95

Territorialist courts were quite clear that their choice-of-law rule
amounted to a restriction on the scope of state law. Construing a personal injury
statute and applying a traditional vested rights approach, the Supreme Court of
Alabama said that the statute must be applied “as if its operation had been
expressly limited to this state, and as if its first line read as follows: ‘When a
personal injury is received in Alabama by a servant or employe,’ etc.” Alabama
Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 807 (1892).
96
A more general way of putting this point, David Franklin has suggested,
is that the supposed dichotomy between internal law and choice-of-law rules is
false: it is impossible to separate the two, and to apply State A internal law alone
is not to apply State A law. The Supreme Court has come close to recognizing
this point. See infra [].
97
What, then, if we suppose that the case is litigated in New York and New
York choice-of-law rules point to Pennsylvania law? The Due Process objection
to the local law theory that I have identified finds no traction now, for New
York’s contacts with the case (unlike Hawaii’s) are sufficient to allow it to
assert legislative jurisdiction: New York courts can apply New York law, shaped
to resemble Pennsylvania internal law, if they choose. If New York purported
truly to be applying Pennsylvania law, I will argue, there would be a Full Faith
and Credit problem, but that problem too is avoided by the local law theory. See
infra []. The reason that the Due Process objection fails, however, is mere
fortuity— New York happens to have sufficient contacts with the transaction, but
those contacts are not the reason it is applying its own law. In some other case,
New York would find itself in the position of Hawaii, i.e., applying its own law
despite the lack of any contacts.
98
See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 314 n.2 (1955)
(Harlan, J. dissenting) (“There must be at least some minimal contact between a
State and a regulated subject before it can, consistently with the requirements of
due process, exercise legislative jurisdiction”).
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governs every transaction litigated in its courts. This consequence
of the local law theory has not gone unremarked. “Under it,”
Elliott Cheatham wrote, “the law of every state applies to every
occurrence in the world and creates at the time of each occurrence
rights and obligations which may later be enforced in the state
creating them.”99 Cook himself agreed. “Shall we, must we, say
that there are as many ‘rights,’ all growing out of the one group of
facts under consideration, as there are jurisdictions which will give
the plaintiff relief?” he asked, and answered that “there seems to
be no other statement to make.”100
The local law theory, then, does not solve the problem of
renvoi within the traditional approach. If anything, it worsens the
difficulty. Not only does it offer no good reason for mimicking
foreign internal law rather than the entirety of foreign law, but its
introduction of the idea of mimicking describes judicial practice
from a perspective that reveals serious constitutional difficulties.
As we shall see, however, the modern approaches are hardly more
successful.
B. Interest Analysis
One of the greatest defects of the traditional approach is
that the axiom of territorial scope may fit poorly with the purposes
behind a state law. A court assessing those purposes might
conclude that they would be better served if the law reached some
events outside the state’s borders, or perhaps if it did not reach

99

Cheatham, supra note [], at 386-87.
Cook, supra note [], at 33. Cook understood assertions about the law to
be no more than predictions of official behavior, see id. at 30, and he does not
appear to have considered the due process implications of his approach. His
general aim was to provide “a reasonably accurate, understandable, and
workable description of judicial phenomena,” and he rightly concluded that the
vested rights approach fit judicial practice poorly. The local law theory might
work somewhat better as a description, but the behavior it describes is
unconstitutional. This makes the theory a less than satisfactory theoretical
resolution of the renvoi problem, though it may well be the case that the
unconstitutionality is more than an artifact of the theory. In fact, I will suggest
just that—much of what judges do in response to the renvoi problem, and in
conflicts generally, is best understood as violating the constitution. See infra [];
see also Roosevelt, supra note [], at 2527-33 (arguing for stronger constitutional
constraints on choice-of-law rules).
100
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some within. Some reacted to this frustration by using the socalled “escape devices” to reach results that seemed more sensible
in terms of hypothesized legislative purpose.101 Brainerd Currie
reacted by creating a whole new approach to choice of law.
Governmental interest analysis, as the name suggests,
focuses attention on the interests of the jurisdictions whose laws
are potentially applicable. A state is interested, on Currie’s
account, if application of its law would promote the purposes
behind the law.102 The forum should apply another state’s law,
101

See generally, e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, Curing the Deficiencies of the
Conflicts Revolution: A Proposal for National Legislation on Choice of Law,
Jurisdiction, and Judgments, 37 Willamette L. Rev. 259, 268 (2001) (discussing
escape devices).
102
See Brainerd Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183
(1963). How one should go about determining whether application of a law
would promote its purpose is not clear. It can certainly be done in some cases—
most everyone would agree that the purpose of a speed limit, for instance, is
served by its application to cases arising on the subject road and not others—but
the typical conflicts case presents more difficult questions, such as whether and
in what circumstances out-of-staters should be entitled to invoke local tort or
contract law. The defenders of interest analysis tend to argue that the process in
such cases is essentially identical to the ordinary work of statutory interpretation
and thus that interest analysis stands on the same footing as the general project
of determining whether statutes apply to marginal cases. See Kramer, supra
note [Renvoi] at 1005-08 (“determining whether a law applies in a multistate
case requires interpreting it in a way that is not qualitatively different from other
legal problems”).
The problem with this claim is that the tools available to guide such
interpretation turn out to be almost exclusively assumptions unrelated to the
particular law being interpreted. That is, while the purpose of a statute relating
to “pedestrians” (for example) may well offer some guidance as to whether inline skaters should be included, it will have substantially less resolving power on
the question of whether skaters from other states count. On that question, the
interest analyst must rely on background assumptions. In consequence, Currie’s
examples of his method look like statutory interpretation only to the extent that
imposing a presumptive domiciliary restriction is interpretive. See, e.g., Currie,
supra note [] at 85 (“What married women [is a Massachusetts contractual
disability intended to apply to]? Why, those with whose welfare Massachusetts
is concerned, of course—i.e., Massachusetts married women.”) Beale’s
approach, which uses a presumptive territorial restriction, is equally
“interpretive.” I find fault with this term to the extent that it suggests a
qualitative difference between Currie and Beale; if Currie’s “of course” counts
as interpretation, then so does Beale’s “by its very nature.” See 1 Beale, supra
note [], at 46. The only question, then, is whether Currie’s presumption is more
sensible than Beale’s.
For general discussions of the plausibility of
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Currie suggested, only if the other state is interested and the forum
is not.103 And in this case, he believed, “it seems clear that the
problem of the renvoi would have no place at all in the analysis
that has been suggested.”104 Because interest analysis had already
determined that the foreign state had “a legitimate interest in the
application of its law and policy to the case at bar … there can be
no question of applying anything other than the internal law of the
foreign state.”105 Interest analysis, in short, eliminates the problem
of renvoi entirely.
As Griswold wrote before rejecting a similarly optimistic
conclusion, “’Tis a consummation devoutly to be wished.”106 The

characterizing interest analysis as statutory construction, see Lea Brilmayer,
Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 Ohio St. L.J.
459, 467 (1985) (“Currie’s illustrative examples do not amount to the ordinary
process of statutory interpretation”); Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth
of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 392 (1980); Herma Hill Kay, A Defense
of Currie’s Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 Recueil des Cours 13, 117-133
(1989) (discussing Brilmayer’s critique) ; Robert Sedler, Interest Analysis and
Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the ‘New Critics, 34
Mercer L. Rev. 593, 620 (1983) (claiming that “the process of determining
policies and interests is exactly the same” in “domestic interpretation and
conflicts interpretation”).
103
Currie, supra note [], at 184. I omit here a discussion of Currie’s
suggestions for other kinds of cases, which are not relevant for my purposes.
For a more general discussion of interest analysis, see, e.g., Kay, supra note
[recueil].
104
Currie, supra note [], at 184.
105
Ibid.
106
Erwin N. Griswold, In Reply to Mr. Cowan’s Views on Renvoi, 87 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 257, 258 (1939). Griswold was responding to Cowan, supra note [],
who argued that a forum should apply foreign choice-of-law rules but should
interpret a foreign selection of the forum’s law as a selection of forum internal
law alone. Anticipating (though reaching a different conclusion than) Hicks,
supra note [], Cowan argued that this was justifiable by analogy to Russell and
Whitehead’s Theory of Types and on the grounds that the business of lawyers
was merely “to avoid contradiction, not necessarily to resolve it, the resolution
of generalized forms of contradiction being the business of logic and not of
law.” Cowan, supra note [], at 45. Griswold quite properly answered that “it
seems difficult to escape the feeling that the result has been assumed, rather than
established.” 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 259. That is, while Cowan offered a method
of dealing with the renvoi that did not lead to paradox, the method had nothing
more than the avoidance of paradox to recommend it; it worked by fiat rather
than analysis. Oddly, Cowan argued that while the ipse dixit nature of the
solution made it inadequate as a matter of logic, “it is entirely legitimate for
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problem is that a court following Currie’s interest analysis plainly
faces the same question as the traditionalists: having decided to
apply the law of another state, is it to apply the entirety of that
state’s law, or only the internal law? It does, admittedly, seem odd
to examine a foreign state’s internal law in order to determine
whether that state’s law should be applied and then to apply not
that internal law but the entirety of foreign law.107 But identifying
an oddity is not the same thing as making an argument; interest
analysis needs some explanation of why the renvoi should be
rejected. As did the traditional approach, interest analysis has
resources for this task. Indeed, on closer inspection, they prove to
be essentially the same moves. And, as we shall see, they fail for
essentially the same reasons.
1.The Inherent Distinctiveness of Choice of Law
The oddity just mentioned appears to be what Currie was
relying on in his suggestion that there was no question of applying
anything but foreign internal law. Indeed, there is a superficial
plausibility to the idea that, having determined that the purposes of
foreign internal law would be served by its application, one should
proceed to that application straightaway without further dalliance
in the choice-of-law field. The proper focus for interest analysis,
Currie evidently thought, is internal law and internal law alone;
choice-of-law rules do not relate to state interests.108 A deeper
investigation, however, shows that this approach runs so counter to
lawyers to postulate where it would be illegitimate for a logician to do the same
thing.” Cowan, supra note [], at 45.
107
The problem, of course, is that applying a foreign choice of law rule may
undo the supposed gains of interest analysis. Having, for instance, decided that
the policies behind the forum’s internal law are not implicated and that those
behind the foreign state’s are, an interest analyst might then find that the foreign
state’s choice of law rules directed the application of the (uninterested) forum’s
law, precisely what interest analysis was to avoid. What this suggests is that
accepting the renvoi is not a happy solution for interest analysis, either. Here
there is indeed an air of “abdication of sovereignty,” as Lorenzen charged
occurred with renvoi generally. See Lorenzen, supra note [columbia], at 205.
108
See Currie, supra note [], at 183-84. For a modern statement of this
position, see Posnak, They Still Don’t Get It, supra note [], at 1140 (“the interest
analyst is saying that the only policies that count in determining whether a state
has an ‘interest’ are the policies behind its competing law, not the policies
behind its choice of law approach or some other policy”).
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the fundamental presuppositions of interest analysis as to flirt with
incoherence.
The great defect of the traditional approach, according to
Currie, was that it resolved choice of law problems in a haphazard
manner, without consideration of the policies underlying the
competing laws.109 In a significant number of cases, then, it
sacrificed the interests of one or another state for no good
reason.110 But what are these interests, and who determines them?
Currie never gave an entirely clear answer to this question,
and much of the debate over interest analysis centers on what it
means to have an interest, and in particular whether state interests
are “objective” or “subjective” (terms whose significance will be
explained soon). But I believe the best reading of his approach—
“best” both in terms of his likely intent and on the merits—takes
them to be simply shorthand for the end result of a process of
statutory construction.111 That is, the first step of interest analysis
is simply a matter of interpreting state law to determine whether it
is intended to apply to a given set of facts.112
109

See Currie, supra note [], at 89-98.
See ibid.
111
Currie suggested (somewhat facetiously) that the aim would be achieved
if “we could buttonhole in the statehouse corridor the personification of the
Massachusetts General Assembly” and get an answer as to which cases the
statute was meant to cover. Currie, supra note [] at 81, 83-84. This line
suggests an intent-focused method of statutory construction. But those who are
skeptical about the existence of legislative intent or the possibility of
personifying a multi-member body may of course substitute their preferred
method; the application of interest analysis does not require any particular
interpretive approach.
112
As the text notes, how faithful this statement is to Currie’s understanding
of interest analysis is not entirely clear. See Kramer, supra note [Rethinking], at
290 n.35; supra note [Renvoi], at 1005 n.91. The claim that interest analysis
seeks constructive intent (i.e., the result the legislature would have approved had
it considered the problem) provides the fulcrum for much of Brilmayer’s early
criticism, see. e.g., Brilmayer, Myth, supra note [] at 393. The partisans of
interest analysis scolded her harshly for the alleged misinterpretation. See, e.g.,
Kay, supra note [recueil] at 127 (“Professor Brilmayer seems impervious to
constructive criticism”); Sedler, supra note [], at 609 (“Professor Brilmayer has
got it all wrong. … Interest analysis is in no sense based on legislative intent,
either actual or constructive”). The vitriol of these responses is puzzling. Kay
and Sedler both agree that the aim of interest analysis is to apply state laws in
circumstances in which doing so promotes the policies or purposes behind them.
See Kay, supra note [], at 125 (stating that Currie was interested “only in how a
110
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But if that is so, it should be immediately obvious that the
forum cannot ignore foreign choice of law rules.113 Those rules,
after all, are the ones that govern precisely the question of whether
a state’s internal law applies.114 Interest analysis is thus by its own
statute or common law rule might be applied to accomplish its underlying
domestic policies”); Sedler, supra note [], at 610 (suggesting that interest
analysts’ “claim is that choice of law decisions should be made with reference to
the policies embodied in rules of substantive law … and the interests of the
involved states in having their laws applied to implement those policies in the
particular case”). But each of these quotes would receive full credit as a
definition of “constructive intent,” which itself is just a method of statutory
interpretation, and statutory interpretation is exactly what everyone agrees
interest analysis claims to use. See, e.g., Scott Freuhwald, Choice of Law in
Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 Brand. L. J. 21, 50 (1988) (urging courts to
“attempt to establish the legislature’s constructive intent by examining the law’s
purpose”); Kramer, supra note [], at 300, (describing this method of statutory
construction as “black letter law” and “the most widely used and accepted
approach to interpretation both in practice and in the academy”). One does not,
at any rate, find many interest analysts arguing that their aim is to produce
results the legislature would not have approved had it considered the question;
nor did Currie suggest that this would be desirable. See Currie, supra note [], at
606 (approvingly describing the Supreme Court’s methodology in a conflicts
case as “trying to decide as it believes Congress would have decided had it
foreseen the problem”).
113
Larry Kramer gives an excellent statement of this point in Return of the
Renvoi, supra note [], at 1005. Kay denies it, though apparently only on the
grounds that state choice-of-law rules do not relate to state interests. See Kay,
supra note [entrails], at 908-910. But the inquiry into the existence of an interest
is simply an intermediate step in the determination of a law’s scope, and given
that legislatures can control scope, their power over interests is irrelevant—as,
indeed, is the term itself. See Kramer, supra note [Myth], at 1064 (“[T]he
‘interest’ terminology is merely conventional. The point of the inquiry is to
determine what rights the state may have conferred on a party”). The most
promising step to advance Currie’s insights might well now be to abandon talk
of interests. Kramer has done so; he phrases the analysis in terms of “prima
facie applicability.” See Kramer, supra note [Renvoi], at 1014 (“I prefer to say
that the state’s law is ‘prima facie applicable’ in order to avoid some the
baggage associated with the term interest”). I would rather talk simply in terms
of scope; as will become clear later, I think it would be an even greater advance
to abandon talk of “applying” a state’s law at all.
114
The point could be disputed, but not, I think, convincingly. In Pfau v.
Trent Aluminum Co., 263 A.2d 129, 137 (N.J. 1970), the court justified
disregard of a territorial choice-of-law rule with the observation that “[l]ex loci
delicti was born in an effort to achieve simplicity and uniformity and does not
relate to a state’s interest in having its law applied to given issues in a tort case.”
As a matter of intellectual history, this is far off; lex loci delicti was born from
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terms committed to the consideration of foreign choice of law
rules, odd though it may seem.115 The assertion of a distinction
inherent in the methodology casts aside provisions of foreign law
specifically directed to the question interest analysis tries to
answer; it makes interest analysis run roughshod over its own
aspirations. Currie’s tentative conclusion cannot stand.116
2.The Appeal to Objectivity
We have seen already that after the failure of the attempt to
deem foreign choice of law rules irrelevant, the next move is to
characterize them as incorrect. The traditionalists did not make
this move as aggressively as they could have, but the interest
analysts did. Indeed, in so doing they seriously overplayed their
hand and came close to compromising the plausibility of interest
analysis as a conflicts methodology altogether. Understanding

the conviction that state power was territorially bounded, and it quite definitely
reflects a conviction that tort law does not reach out-of-state events. See
Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 807 (1892) (equating
operation of territorialist choice-of-law rule to explicit territorial restriction in
text of statute).
115
One way of eliminating the oddity, of course, would be to consider
foreign choice of law rules at the stage of determining whether the foreign state
is interested. This solution is, I believe, essentially correct, and I discuss it in
more detail infra [].
116
In saying this I do not mean to disparage Currie’s contribution. His
fundamental insight—that choice of law analysis can largely be assimilated to
the process of determining the scope of state-created rights in purely domestic
cases—is a tremendous conceptual advance. And even his brief and tentative
discussion of renvoi contains two important observations, first that renvoi is
“wholly artificial, being raised merely by the form of choice-of-law rules” and
second that renvoi within interest analysis is similar to “the case in which
neither state has an interest in the application of its law and policy … .” Currie,
supra note [], at 184. The first observation is accurate, though I disagree with
Currie over the source of the renvoi problem and believe he failed to eliminate
it. See infra []. The second describes what in Currie’s terminology is called an
“unprovided-for” case. Again, Currie was correct to link this phenomenon to
renvoi, but because he did not himself fully understand the implications of his
method, he suggested that in such cases “the forum would apply its own law
simply on the ground that that is the more convenient disposition.” Ibid. The
correct analysis is found in Larry Kramer, The Myth of the Unprovided-for Case,
75 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (1989). The relationship between the unprovided-for case
and renvoi is discussed infra [].
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how this happened requires a more detailed discussion of the
nature of state interests.
In the preceding section, I adopted a perspective that takes
state interests as “subjective.” That is, whether a state is interested
in a transaction is shorthand for whether the transaction falls within
the scope of that state’s law. Determining the scope of a state’s
law is a matter of interpreting it, and the courts and legislature of
that state are of course authoritative in the drafting and
interpretation of their own law.
I have said that I find this understanding of interest analysis
best on the merits, for reasons that will appear shortly. And to the
extent that Currie addressed the issue explicitly, he seems to have
endorsed it.117 But it is possible also to suppose that states are not
authoritative with respect to the existence or nonexistence of their
interests—that is, that state interests are “objective” and outside the
control of the state courts and legislatures. If this is so, then a
forum may safely substitute interest analysis for whatever a foreign
state’s choice-of-law rules provide. The forum is entitled to decide
for itself whether a foreign state is interested, and having made that
decision, it has resolved the question of whether that state’s law
should apply. The foreign state’s choice of law rules may
prescribe a different conclusion, but that is of no moment—to the
extent that they suggest that the foreign state’s law does not apply
(i.e., that the foreign state is not interested), they are simply wrong.
This is the appeal to objectivity for interest analysis. If it
strikes readers as unconvincing, I can say only that I share that
evaluation. It may be possible to give a more sympathetic
exposition of the move, but I do not find those of its proponents
any more plausible. Peter Westen argued, for example, that “[i]f
the forum decides that a foreign state is interested in a case by
looking to that state’s conflicts law, it subordinates its own choice
117

In addition to suggesting that that the existence of an interest could be
ascertained by asking the personification of the state legislature, see supra [],
Currie observed that an interest analyst’s conclusions with respect to state
policies and interests, based as they were on assessment of the purpose of a
state’s law, “are tentative and subject to modification on the advice of those who
know better”—namely, state courts and legislatures. Currie, supra note [], at
592. He did, moreover, suggest that explicit legislative statements as to scope
were authoritative and desirable. Id. at 171-72. But see Lea Brilmayer, The
Other State’s Interest, 24 Cornell In. L. J. 233, 241 (1991) (asserting that Currie
“almost certainly” had an objective conception of interests).
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of law rule to that of the foreign state, however archaic the latter
may be.”118 But the whole venture of choice of law, as Griswold
had earlier observed in response to just this claim, consists in
“telling a court when it should cast aside its own rule in favor of
one that is preferred abroad[.]”119 Herma Hill Kay’s suggestion
that “[t]he mere fact that [a foreign state] might mistakenly fail to
recognize her own interests need not prevent [the forum] from
recognizing her interests on her behalf”120 is similarly puzzling:
unless they run afoul of constitutional restrictions, states cannot be
“mistaken” about the scope of their law.121
John David Egnal has described this approach as
“megalomaniacal and a serious breach of the forum’s obligation
under the full faith and credit clause.”122 Those are strong words,
but the description is apt. The problem, the same one we have
seen attending the assertion of inherent distinctiveness, is that an
approach that seeks to determine whether foreign law is intended
to apply can hardly justify contradicting those provisions of
foreign law that address applicability. If foreign choice of law
rules can be wrong, then state interests must be objective, and in
that case interest analysis again runs headlong into itself: it is
118

Peter Westen, Note, False Conflicts, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 74, 85 (1967).
Griswold, supra note [], at 1178.
120
Herma Hill Kay, Comment on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
551, 589 n.31 (1968).
121
Kay’s point in that Comment was the standard interest analysis claim
that choice-of-law rules—especially the conventional ones prevalent in 1968—
do not reflect state policy. See Kay, supra note [entrails] at 913 (arguing that
traditional choice-of-law rules “provide no [] information” as to whether a state
“would choose to assert its domestic interest” and that consequently “my
willingness in 1968 to permit California to recognize Ohio’s domestic interests
on her behalf still seems justified”). As a current prescription, she urges that “a
court following interest analysis should still disregard the other state’s
traditional choice of law rule as irrelevant to its initial inquiry into the policies
and interests underlying that state’s domestic law.” See id. at 914. The problem
with both of these positions, as Carroll makes clear, is that courts following
traditional rules did quite clearly understand them as limitations on the scope of
state law. See Carroll, 11 So. at 807. A restriction on scope may not be
identical to the absence of an interest, but it is dispositive with respect to the
question of whether a law may be applied to a transaction. If a transaction does
not fall within the law’s scope, any talk of interests is irrelevant.
122
John David Egnal, The “Essential” Role of Modern Renvoi in the
Governmental Interest Analysis Approach to Choice of Law, 54 Temple L. Q.
237, 265 n.145 (1981).
119
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defying provisions of state law (the choice of law rules) that are
plainly intended to apply. On this account, interest analysis loses
all plausibility as an attempt to vindicate state policies, at least
where such “policies” are understood as those the state has
asserted, rather than the product of a priori theorizing. As
Brilmayer put it, “Currie was as metaphysical as Beale.”123
The interest analysts, of course, took pains to avoid reliance
on metaphysics and tended to describe their approach as
enlightened rather than correct.124 But this is simply a more polite
123

Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A
Challenge, 35 Mercer L. Rev. 555, 563 (1984). Brilmayer has suggested to the
contrary that a state’s choice-of-law rules should be respected to the same extent
as its internal law. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 105-09 (1995). The
1995 treatise recapitulates some of the high points of decades of earlier attacks
on interest analysis. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis:
A House Without Foundations, 46 Ohio State L. J. 459 (1985); Lea Brilmayer,
Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 392
(1980). For a sampling of responses, see, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of
Currie’s Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 Recueil des Cours 50 (1989);
Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law—Interest Analysis: They Still Don’t Get It, 40
Wayne L. Rev. 1121 (1994) (hereinafter Posnak, “They Still Don’t Get It”);
Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its “New Crits,” 36 Am. J.
Comp. L. 681 (1989); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis as the Preferred
Approach: A Response to Professor Brilmayer’s “Foundational Attack,” 46
Ohio State L. J. 483 (1985); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum
Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the “New Critics,” 34 Mercer
L. Rev. 593 (1983). To the extent that interest analysts asserted the propriety, or
even the possibility, of ignoring foreign choice of law rules, I believe
Brilmayer’s condemnation is correct. But as Larry Kramer has argued, there is
no reason for interest analysis to put that particular millstone around its neck.
See Kramer, supra note [renvoi], at 1005 (suggesting that adherence to “Currie’s
basic insight” should lead interest analysts to respect foreign choice of law
rules). It is not my purpose here to take a side in the dispute over interest
analysis, something that the diversity of views as to the content of that approach
would make difficult in any event. See Herma Hill Kay, The Use of
Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the
California Experience, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 577, 615 (1980) (describing modern
choice-of-law theory as “stagnant pools of doctrine, each jealously guarded by
its adherents”); Phaedon John Kozyris, Conflicts Theory for Dummies: Apres Le
Deluge, Where Are We On Producers Liability, 60 La. L. Rev. 1161, 1169 n.23
(2000) (“Indeed, interest analysis is becoming as diverse as Christianity or
Marxism”).
124
See, e.g., Posnak, They Still Don’t Get It, supra note [], at 1134-36
(discussing treatment of foreign choice-of-law rules under interest analysis as
designed to avoid “irrational” results).
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version of the appeal to objectivity, and it cures none of the
defects. Other states may well have adopted unenlightened rules to
determine when their law applies, but interest analysis is
committed to respecting the judgment of “those who know
better.”125
Indeed, Egnal is quite to right to suggest that the assertion
of objectivity or superior enlightenment presents serious
constitutional difficulties. If a state law, for instance, is explicitly
territorial in scope126 (e.g., a wrongful death statute that applies
only to deaths “caused within this state”) it is a violation of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to apply it to those caused beyond its
borders, even if the decedent is a state domiciliary with whose
welfare the state is (of course) concerned. The interest analysts
who suggested that the forum may recognize the other state’s
interests127 or that the forum should “apply the law of the other
state, even though that law doesn’t want to be applied”128 would
surely balk at the suggestion that the forum should allow recovery
even though the foreign law does not allow it.129 But—if a choice
125

Currie, supra note [], at 592. See BRILMAYER, supra note [treatise], at
106 (“If [the forum] respects ‘stupid’ substantive preferences by other states,
why not ‘stupid’ choice of law preferences? The fact is that an authoritative
organ of the state has decreed that what the state ‘wants’ is to have its law
applied in certain cases but not in others.”). But see Posnak, They Still Don’t
Get It, supra note [], at 1140 (“the interest analyst is saying that the only policies
that count in determining whether a state has an ‘interest’ are the policies behind
its competing law, not the policies behind its choice of law approach or some
other policy”).
126
Since at this point I am discussing renvoi within interest analysis, the
introduction of a territorial statute may seem not to play fair. But there is no bar
to a state’s defining its interests in territorial terms—unless, of course, interests
are objective, an alternative the text offers reasons to reject. Indeed, if the
question of whether a state is interested is the question of whether its law is
intended to apply, such a territorial restriction should be considered the clearest
possible definition of the state’s interest.
127
See Kay, supra note [], at 589 n.31.
128
David F. Cavers, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 106 (1965).
129
Posnak does suggest that the forum should ignore an express statement
of legislative intent that a state law reach a particular transaction, arguing that
“[i]f the forum were bound to apply this foreign law or even bound merely to
attribute an ‘interest’ to the foreign state, it could lead to a result that is irrational
in terms of the policies of the competing laws and the facts of the case.”
Posnak, They Still Don’t Get It, supra note [], at 1134-35. The assertion that
applying a state law to a transaction explicitly placed within its scope by the
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of law rule is equivalent to an explicit restriction within a statute—
that is precisely what they suggest via the appeal to objectivity.130
At this point it is appropriate to address that “if” in more
detail. That choice-of-law rules are akin to explicit restrictions on
statutory scope is one of the central claims of this Article, the
premise that powers most of its conclusions. It is not a novel
claim; John Westlake made it over a hundred years ago,131 and it
plays a similar central role in both Brilmayer’s critique of interest
analysis132 and Kramer’s investigation of renvoi.133 In each of
these contexts it has been disputed.134
The arguments offered in support, though persuasive to me,
are perhaps the sort of things that convince only those who have
already had similar thoughts. Kramer asserts that a choice-of-law
rule is a rule of interpretation, and further that rules of

legislature could be irrational in terms of that law’s policy is a stark example of
how the appeal to objectivity rejects the policymaking authority of state
legislatures. Posnak would give somewhat more, though not conclusive, weight
to an express statement that a state law does not reach a particular transaction on
the grounds that such a limitation “is analogous to a declaration against
interest.” Id. at 1135 n.72.
130
They might have been on firmer ground had they attempted to justify the
rejection of foreign choice of law rules as a form of depecage—the application
of parts of multiple states’ laws. But depecage makes sense only when the
portion of each states’ law that is applied can be severed from the remainder
without doing violence to its coherence, and ignoring a choice of law rule makes
no more sense than severing a territorial restriction internal to a statute. See
infra [].
131
See JOHN WESTLAKE, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 38
th
(7 ed. 1925) (concluding “that a rule referring to a foreign law should be
understood as referring to the whole of that law, necessarily including the limits
which it sets to its own application, without a regard to which it would not be
really that law that was applied”). The first edition of the treatise was published
1858. Id. at ii.
Bate dates Westlake’s acceptance of renvoi to his 1900
contribution to the discussions of the Institute on International Law. See JOHN
PAWLEY BATE, NOTES ON THE DOCTRINE OF RENVOI IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1904).
132
See BRILMAYER, supra note [treatise] at 105-09.
133
See Kramer, supra note [renvoi] at 1011 (“A state’s approach to choice
of law by definition establishes the state’s rules of interpretation for questions of
extraterritorial scope.”).
134
See Lorenzen, supra note [columbia] at 203 (dismissing Westlake’s
claim as “an absurdity”); Posnak, They Still Don’t Get It, supra note [], at 1123
n6, 1131 (criticizing Kramer and Brilmayer).
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interpretation are “part of a state’s positive law.”135 Brilmayer
challenges interest analysis on its own terms, arguing that choiceof-law rules are expressions of policy, even if “unenlightened”
from the perspective of interest analysis, and must be heeded for
that reason.136 Neither of these arguments is a 100% knockdown.
Interest analysts might simply deny the premises and respond that
choice-of-law rules are not rules of interpretation, and that
traditional rules do not reflect any policy judgment—indeed, they
have.137
My purpose in these paragraphs is to ask whether a
stronger case can be made.
With regard to the traditional approach, as I have
demonstrated, the equivalence of territorial choice-of-law rules and
statutory restrictions is implied by the theoretical apparatus and
was explicitly recognized by courts.138 But the same cannot be
said of interest analysis. The academics most committed to its
defense maintain that a foreign state’s choice-law-rules cannot be
considered dispositive on the question of whether that state’s law
reaches a transaction.139 Similar pronouncements have been made
by courts.140
It is possible to argue, as I have above, that disregarding
foreign choice-of-law rules does in fact run counter to the central
aspiration of interest analysis and that therefore interest analysis is
committed by its own principles to respect them (which I take to be
essentially Brilmayer’s point). It is also possible to show, as I will
below, that respecting foreign choice-of-law rules need not lead to
renvoi, and the practice could for that reason be recommended on
grounds of practical utility. But neither of these argumentative
tacks is decisive, and so my aim here is to suggest that there is a
135

Kramer, supra note [renvoi] at 1008-10.
See BRILMAYER, supra note [treatise] at 106-07.
137
See sources cited supra note [].
138
As the Supreme Court of Alabama put it, construing a personal injury
statute and applying a territorial approach, the statute must be applied “as if its
operation had been expressly limited to this state, and as if its first line read as
follows: ‘When a personal injury is received in Alabama by a servant or
employe,’ etc.”Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 807
(1892).
139
See, e.g., Posnak, They Still Don’t Get It, supra note [], at 1134 (“The
forum court owes little deference to a foreign legislature”).
140
See, e.g., Pfau, 263 A.2d at 137 (suggesting that traditional choice of law
rules can be ignored by courts following policy-oriented approaches).
136
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constitutional argument for deference to foreign choice-of-law
rules.
The basic point—that state courts and legislatures are
authoritative with respect to the scope of their own law—is well
established and need not detain us long. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that state-court constructions of state law are
generally binding on federal courts.141 State courts plainly have no
greater power than federal courts in the interpretation of sister-state
law, and the principle applies equally in the interstate context: state
courts of last resort are authoritative with respect to the meaning of
their law.142
But the foregoing gets us only to the stage of raising the
fundamental question. Certainly, state courts are authoritative as
to the meaning of their own law; and certainly, whether a state’s
141

See, e.g., Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 518-19 (1897). For a
more modern statement of the proposition, see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S.
654, 674 (2002). The exceptions fall into two basic classes. First, state court
applications of state law can be reviewed where the consequence is the denial of
a federal right. Thus a state-court determination that no contract exists can
defeat a litigant’s claim under the Contract Clause, and a determination that a
litigant has defaulted a federal claim under state procedure can justify refusal to
hear that claim. In such cases, federal courts assert some power to second-guess
the state-law ruling. See, generally, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the
States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law Judgments, 101 Mich.
L. Rev. 80, 83 n.11 (2002) (discussing “antecedent state ground”), Kermit
Roosevelt III, Light From Dead Stars: The Adequate and Independent State
Ground Reconsidered, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1888, 1889 n1 (2003) (same).
Second, some interpretations of state law may be so unexpected as to violate the
Due Process Clause. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)
(holding that state-court interpretation of state law departed so far from
precedent as to constitute a Due Process violation). In both these circumstances,
the presence of a federal right makes the difference.
142
The principle is somewhat less developed in the interstate context, but it
does exist; indeed, it has a clear textual basis in the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
See, e.g., Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 731 (1988) (noting that clear and
willful misinterpretation of sister state law violates Full Faith and Credit
Clause). It would seem at any rate to follow more or less immediately from the
rationale for state interpretive supremacy vis-à-vis federal courts, which is that
“the exclusive authority to enact [state] laws carries with it final authority to say
what they mean.” Jones v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 273 U.S. 195, 200 (1927). States
obviously cannot make law for each other. See BMW of North America v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996) (“No State can legislate except with reference to its own
jurisdiction … Each State is independent of all the others in this particular”) (quoting
Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1884)).
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law applies to a particular set of facts is a question of its
meaning.143 But do choice-of-law rules delimit the substantive
scope of state law?
Again, it is useful to look to the interaction of state and
federal courts, where the questions of respective authority have
been addressed in more detail. The Supreme Court has, it turns
out, stated explicitly that a federal court applying state law must
heed the limits set by that state’s choice-of-law rules. Klaxon v.
Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. holds that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction cannot second-guess state courts
as to the scope of their law; subject only to constitutional
constraints, a state “is free to determine whether a given matter
should be governed by the law of the forum … .”144 A federal
court lacks the power to disregard the limitations that a state,
through its choice-of-law rules, has placed on the scope of its
law.145 To put the point slightly differently, Klaxon recognizes that
to apply state law means to apply the entirety of state law; the idea
that internal law may be separated out and “applied” by itself is
simply false. Thus, it would seem, the Court has recognized that
state choice-of-law rules amount to restrictions on the scope of
state law and bind other forums.146
143

See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. N.O. Nelson Mfg. Co.,
291 U.S. 352, 358 (1934) (“As to the meaning of the statute …, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi speaks with ultimate authority. We assume in accordance
with its ruling that the statute was intended to apply to a bond such as the one in
controversy here … .”).
144
313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
145
Klaxon, of course, deals with federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction, but the principle that a federal court applying state law must
observe the limits placed on that law by the state’s choice-of-law rules has been
recognized in the context of pendent jurisdiction as well. United Mine Workers
of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966), directs federal courts to follow
Erie in deciding state-law claims under pendent jurisdiction, and lower courts
have understood the directive to include Klaxon as progeny of Erie. See, e.g.,
Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1179 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992).
146
I thus read Klaxon to be constitutionally grounded in a certain sense. It
recognizes that state choice-of-law rules relate to the substantive scope of state
law, and thus that federal courts purporting to apply state law must respect the
limits set out by choice-of-law rules. A federal court disregarding state choiceof-law rules would no more be applying that law of that state than would a
federal court applying one section of a state statute while ignoring another.
Whatever constitutional bar exists to the latter practice also forbids the former.
This is not to say that the constitution requires federal courts to apply any
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Matters are not quite that simple, however, for the quoted
sentence continues “or some other.”147 Klaxon thus requires
federal courts to adhere to state choice-of-law rules not merely on
the question of whether local law applies, but also with respect to
the application of foreign law. This second step is, or should be,
puzzling. It grants to state courts the power denied those of the
federal government—the power to ignore a state’s determination,
as expressed in its choice-of-law rules, whether its law applies.
But state courts, we have seen, have no greater power than federal
courts to ignore authoritative constructions of sister-state law.
The explanation is presumably that the Klaxon Court saw
that imposing similar requirements on the states would lead
directly to the infinite regress of renvoi. If each state must, when
applying the law of another state, apply that state’s choice-of-law
rules, the Constitution seems to have turned out to be a suicide pact
after all: it has prescribed the very circulus inextricabilis the
traditionalists invoked as reason enough to reject the renvoi.
Impossibility of compliance is sufficient excuse to ignore a
constitutional demand. The Supreme Court has said as much in
considering the limits the Full Faith and Credit Clause sets on
choice-of-law rules. There it pointed out that a straightforward
application of the constitutional text would seem to require that
“the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the

particular state’s law in diversity actions (the main Klaxon question), or even to
apply state law at all (the Erie question); it is only to say that “applying” state
law means applying state choice-of-law rules to the extent they specify the scope
of state law.
The scholarship focusing on Klaxon is sparser than that discussing Erie,
which of course is not saying much. See Maurice Rosenberg, et al., Elements of
Civil Procedure 390 (4th ed. 1985) (noting that the volume of Erie scholarship is
enough to “sink it without a trace”). A valuable recent contribution is Patrick
Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, The Rise of Legal Positivism,
and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 79 (1993).
Borchers argues that Erie, and by extension Klaxon, are not constitutionally
grounded; federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction need not apply state
law. See id. at 118-19. This article takes no position on that broader question; it
asserts only that Klaxon was correct in recognizing that a federal court ignoring
the scope of state law as set out in that state’s choice-of-law rules is not applying
that state’s law in any meaningful sense.
147
Ibid.
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other, but cannot be in its own”—an obviously absurd result.148
Unable to read the text literally, the Court has responded by
draining it of meaning.149
But we should not give up so easily. The Court was
mistaken, I have argued, in thinking that no plausible method
exists to implement a meaningful Full Faith and Credit
requirement.150 And it was mistaken to suppose that recognizing
choice-of-law rules as authoritative restrictions on the scope of
state law would generate paradox. In fact, consistent application of
Klaxon’s basic principle resolves the difficulty: giving each state
authority with respect to the scope of its own law simultaneously
denies it authority with respect to other states’ laws. (Thus, it
should be clear, I am not arguing that applying a state’s law means
respecting the prescriptions of its choice-of-law rules as to whether
some other state’s law applies—indeed, I am arguing that on that
issue, the other state’s choice-of-law rules have final say.) What
Klaxon should have said, then, is simply that all courts, in applying
a state’s law, are bound by the restrictions on scope embodied in
that state’s choice-of-law rules.151
Of course, Klaxon did not say that, and an argument that
relies on the first half of a sentence while disregarding the second
is somewhat less than indisputable as a reading of the doctrine. I
do not, and could not, claim that the current Supreme Court sees
things this way, or is likely to in the near future. What I have tried
to suggest is that the logic behind Klaxon does lead, more or less
inexorably, to the conclusion that states cannot ignore sister-state
choice-of-law rules. That state courts are supreme in the

148

Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532, 547

(1935).
149

See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 295
(1992) (characterizing the Court’s approach as supposing that “the phrase cannot
be taken literally, and therefore it need not be taken seriously at all”).
150
See Roosevelt, supra note [], at 2503-10, 2528-29 (offering Full Faith
and Credit methodology).
151
The Supreme Court of Montana seems to have reached essentially this
conclusion. In Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Mont.
2000), it noted that North Carolina “adheres to the traditional place of injury
rule” and that therefore “the scope of North Carolina product liability law does
not include causes of action for products purchased in North Carolina by North
Carolina residents which cause injury outside of North Carolina.”
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exposition of their own law is one of the most fundamental
postulates of our post-Erie jurisprudence. From that principle it
follows that each state is authoritative as to the scope of its own
law—and consequently not authoritative with respect to the scope
of foreign law. Thus, foreign choice-of-law rules must be heeded,
at least to the extent that they relate to the scope of foreign law.152
The only way to escape this line of reasoning, I believe, is to argue
that choice-of-law rules are not in fact about the scope of state law;
they are something like procedural rules with no direct link to
substantive law. But that is precisely the move that Klaxon rejects,
albeit incompletely.
This is an important conclusion, and one to which I will
return repeatedly. Its significance for this section, however, is
simply that it demonstrates that the appeal to objectivity is no
sounder for interest analysis than it was for the traditional
approach.
3.The Local Law Theory
The local law theory was little pursued by interest analysts,
either because they believed the appeal to objectivity sufficient, or
because of the obvious tension with the aspirations of the
methodology. But it could be seen as implicit in Westen’s
suggestion that states should disregard foreign choice-of-law rules
to avoid subordinating their own rules.153 If one is willing to
supplant foreign choice of law rules with those of the forum, why
not take the next step and place the entire matter within the
authority of forum law? Indeed, if one concedes that foreign law,
for unenlightened reasons, does not apply to the case at hand, why
should not forum law come to the rescue? David Cavers identified
renvoi as a problem for interest analysis and considered and
rejected the first two moves.154 Then he commented “For me, the

152

Choice-of-law rules may perform another function: they may resolve
conflicts between rights created by the laws of different states by specifying
which right shall prevail. I call these rules “rules of priority” in distinction to
“rules of scope.” See infra [].
153
See supra [].
154
CAVERS, supra note [], at 106 (noting that the forum could “deny that X
knows its own interest or that its conventional choice-of-law rule identifies that
interest”)
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question seems to be easy of solution. … Why ought the forum not
adhere to its own self-restricting interpretation and apply the law of
the other state, even though that law doesn’t want to be
applied?”155
As stated, this sounds much like the appeal to objectivity,
i.e., a determination that forum choice of law rules should trump
those of the foreign state. But Cavers had a somewhat different
idea in mind. “If the forum is satisfied that its domestic rule
should not be applied and that the X rule provides an appropriate
norm, given its purposes and the connection of the event or
transaction with State X,” he continued “then why should the
forum refrain from using the X rule?”156 Although Cavers does
not explicitly state that the “X rule” should be applied as forum
law, the logic of his suggestion is that of Cook’s version of the
local law theory: the X rule should be applied because the forum
has deemed it substantively appropriate, without reference to the
question of whether any rights actually exist under X law.157
As a general approach to choice of law, the local law theory
fits oddly with interest analysis. When interest analysis directs the
application of foreign law, it does so because the foreign state is
interested and the forum is not. It is hard to see, as a general
matter, why in such cases foreign law should be assimilated to
forum law rather than being applied directly. Cavers seems to
suggest local law simply as a specific patch to solve the renvoi
problem, but even in this guise it is inadequate. In fact, it manages
to combine the defects of both the moves already rejected.
First, the methodological contradiction that accompanied
the assertion of inherent distinctiveness remains. Even if local law
is invoked only to overcome a renvoi, there is no explanation for
155

Ibid.
Ibid.
157
See supra []. The other approach it resembles is what Perry Dane has
called the use of rules of assimilation, the process of shaping forum law to
resemble foreign law. Assimilation likewise works by adopting some of the
substance of foreign law without regard to whether or how the adopted law
would be applied by a foreign court. As Currie put it, foreign law is sought not
as a rule of decision but “for the collateral purpose of ascertaining some datum
that will be relevant in the application of the rule of decision which is
unquestionably provided by the law of the forum.” Currie, supra note [], at 69;
see also id. at 178; Herma Hill Kay, Conflict of Laws: Foreign Law as Datum,
53 Cal. L. Rev. 47 (1965).
156
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why the existence of renvoi makes it appropriate to disregard
foreign choice of law rules. Second, the constitutional difficulties
associated with the appeal to objectivity persist—though perhaps
to a lesser degree.158 The local law theory does not allow interest
analysis to overcome the renvoi.
4.A Solution?
What the preceding sections demonstrate is that the
analytical moves by which the traditionalists vainly sought to
overcome the renvoi are no more effective in the hands of the
interest analysts. None of the three standard gambits offers a
convincing reason to reject the renvoi, or any method of
terminating the regress if the renvoi is accepted. Interest analysis,
however, has one more device that must be considered.
The reason Currie believed interest analysis eliminated the
problem of renvoi, I have said, is likely the prima facie oddity of
analyzing a foreign state’s internal law in order to determine
whether it is interested, and then applying not that internal law but
the entirety of foreign law. Currie concluded that if internal law
alone was consulted to ascertain state interests, “there can be no
question of applying anything other than the internal law of the
foreign state.”159
The conclusion makes a good deal of sense; the premise,
however, is flawed. Currie might as well have asked why interests
were determined by examining internal law, rather than the entire
law, and though he did not, others did. Choice of law rules, Arthur
Von Mehren suggested, might very well be relevant to the question
of whether a foreign state is interested, and in consequence he
urged that “the question posed by the renvoi approach be asked at
the very beginning, before the forum formulates its choice-of-law

158

The Due Process problem of applying forum law despite a lack of
contacts between the forum and the litigation may be reduced because if foreign
choice of law rules select forum law, the required contacts will be lacking only
if the foreign rule is unconstitutional, which will be a rare case. The problem
does arise, however, in cases in which the foreign choice of law rules select the
law of a third state.
159
Currie, supra note [], at 184.
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rule for the case.”160 One ought, in other words, to consider
foreign choice of law rules not after foreign law has been selected
but in the course of deciding whether it should be selected.
Von Mehren was one of the early proponents of this
position, but he was by no means alone. Paul Freund made a
similar suggestion in 1946,161 and as what von Mehren called the
“functional approach” to choice of law grew in popularity, others
followed. Some interest analysts—notably those who sought to
avoid renvoi via the appeal to objectivity—protested on the
grounds that consulting the foreign state’s choice of law rules
amounted to subordinating local policies.162 But the suggestion
won broad approval; Egnal lists Cavers, Weintraub and Leflar
among its adherents.163
Because this approach is quite similar to one I will consider
later, I postpone a full discussion. As put forth by von Mehren, it
is not a complete solution because it considers foreign choice of
law rules only as useful guides to the construction of interests, not
definitive statements.164 Additionally, it deems them useful only if
they reflect an enlightened or “functional” approach; almost no one
suggested that a territorial choice-of-law rule should be heeded.165
160

Arthur Taylor von Mehren, The Renvoi and its Relation to Various
Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE
AND CONFLICTS LAW 390, (K. Nadelman, A. von Mehren & J Hazard eds.
1961).
161
See Paul Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv.
L. Rev. 1210, 1217 (1946) (“A second means of harmonizing by looking more
closely at the competing laws may be found by examining not merely the policy
but the conflict-of-laws delimitation of each law.”).
162
See supra notes []-[].
163
Egnal, supra note [], at 255. See also Posnak, supra note [], at 1135-36
(suggesting that “the question of whether the foreign state would apply its own
law should be relevant if the foreign state follows some form of the ‘new
learning’).
164
See Kramer, supra note [renvoi], at [].
165
“In a fully developed system of functional choice-of-law rules,” von
Mehren wrote, “much vital information would be stated in a jurisdiction’s
choice-of-law rules. In such a system, these rules would be relatively
particularized and nuanced; they should state fairly precisely whether the
jurisdiction wishes to regulate a given issue at all, and, if so, under what
conditions.” Von Mehren, supra note [], at 393. Systems that are less welldeveloped or less functional, apparently, could be ignored. Interest analysts do,
occasionally, even give weight to territorial choice-of-law rules, but they tend to
do so opportunistically, in order to avoid an otherwise difficult choice, rather
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Last, it seems to take the foreign conclusion as to whether or not
foreign law applies as a bivalent variable—either the law applies or
it does not—rather than distinguishing between the questions of
whether foreign rights exist and whether they should prevail over
conflicting forum rights. This distinction is the linchpin of what I
will call the two-step model, and I develop it further in Part III.
Before the more general discussion, however, there is one more
modern choice of law approach to consider.
C.The Second Restatement
The scholars of the American Legal Institute began work
on the Restatement, Second, of Conflict of Law in 1953, by which
point the academic revolt against Beale’s pieties was well
underway. Ferment in the courts and law reviews made it difficult
for the drafters to agree on which approaches should win a place in
the Restatement, and the project was not completed until 1961.166
Despite its lengthy preparation, the Restatement strikes
many readers as half-baked. Its central command is to apply the
law of the state with “the most significant relationship,”167 but
identifying that state is no easy task. Section six, the centerpiece
of the Restatement, offers seven relevant factors but no explanation
of how to weigh them or decide cases in which the factors point to
different states, a silence that in the words of Joseph Singer
“mystifies rather than clarifies.”168
Because the Second Restatement contains a mélange of
different approaches rather than a distinct conceptual perspective,

than for any consistent theoretical reason. See generally Kramer, supra note
[renvoi], at 1002.
166
See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The
Restatement (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 329, 330 &
n8 (1997).
167
See Restatement, Second, of Conflict of Laws (1971) §§ 145(1) (torts),
188 (contracts).
168
Joseph Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 77 (1989). For other
examples of academic criticism, see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of
Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law,
92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 253 (“Trying to be all things to all people, [the Second
Restatement] produced mush”); Shaman, supra note [], at 357-64 (“Because the
second Restatement tries to be so much and do so much, it is rife with
inconsistency, incongruence, and incoherence”).
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it is difficult to evaluate its success in handling renvoi. Like the
First Restatement, the Second instructs courts generally to reject
the renvoi and apply the internal law of the selected state;169 like
the First, it offers no detailed explanation of why foreign choice of
law rules should not be applied.170 If explanation is sought, the
same three moves discussed above are available.
Unsurprisingly, they fail for the same reasons: nothing in
the most significant relationship test explains why choice of law
rules can be distinguished from internal law, or gives the forum
authority to override foreign choice of rules, or suggests that
foreign internal law should be assimilated into forum law.
None of the moves has been much invoked by scholars,
perhaps because the Second Restatement is too indeterminate to
lend itself to theorizing. And indeed, the value of the Second
Restatement for this article is not that it offers a distinctive
approach to renvoi, but rather that it presents a pure example of a
certain type of approach to conflicts—one that, like the others, has
saddled itself with unnecessary difficulties. The renvoi problem, I
will show, is indeed an artifact—not of any particular approach to
conflicts, as Currie thought, but of the picture that inspires the
various approaches, the picture according to which the task of a
court facing a choice-of-law problem is to follow its choice-of-law
rules in order to determine which state’s law applies.
Understanding where this picture goes wrong, and how its error
169

See Restatement, Second, § 8(1). Subsection 8(2) makes an exception
for cases in which “the objective of the particular choice-of-law rule is that the
forum reach the same result on the very facts involved as would the courts of
another state … .”
170
Comment d to subsection 8(1) describes renvoi as a problem of
characterization (determining whether “law” should be taken to mean internal
law or entire law) and admits that “no … obvious answer exists.” Comment h to
subsection 8(2) explains that the exception will apply “when the other state
clearly has the dominant interest in the issue to be decided and its interest would
be furthered by having the issue decided in the way that its courts would have
done.” The Restatement does, however, suggest evaluating state interests in a
manner akin to that discussed in the preceding subsection, that is, it suggests that
the question of whether a foreign state would apply its own law is relevant to
(though not dispositive of) the question of whether that state should be deemed
to have an interest. See Restatement, Second, § 8 comment k at 28; § 145
comment h at 425. Like von Mehren’s approach, these recommendations
indicate some progress towards what I call the two-step model, and represent an
encouraging advance.
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has been embedded in the various approaches, requires the
deployment of a different perspective on conflicts. Explaining that
perspective is the task of the next part.
III. REVISING RENVOI
A.

The Two-Step Model

The preceding part has demonstrated that none of the
leading approaches to conflicts offers a satisfactory resolution of
the renvoi problem. The importance of this failure would be
reduced if states could at least agree on a choice-of-law
methodology. Renvoi would still arise, as discussed earlier, as a
consequence of differences in characterization or substantive law,
but it would do so less frequently. Its continuing significance
depends in part on the fact that no agreement has materialized, and
none seems likely in the foreseeable future. The most recent of
Dean Symeonides’ invaluable surveys of American conflicts law
shows that no choice-of-law approach predominates.171 The
Second Restatement enjoys plurality status, but that tends if
anything to reduce agreement, for the Second Restatment’s
application can vary so much from court to court as to virtually
amount to distinct approaches. Methodological pluralism, in short,
is the order of the day.
That makes things harder. The interest analysts who
appealed to objectivity were at their most plausible when they
asserted that territorial choice-of-law rules were not well thoughtout restrictions on the scope of state law but simply relics of the
past, fated for obsolescence as soon as their authors grasped the
new learning.172 Given the dogged persistence of the First
171

Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002:
Sixteenth Annual Survey, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 4-5 & n17 (2003) (citing
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000: As the
Century Turns, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (2001)).
172
See, e.g., David E. Seidelson, The Americanization of Renvoi, 7 Duq. L.
Rev. 201, 211 (1968) (suggesting that courts should disregard only those lex loci
decisions that are vestiges of less sophisticated period). From one perspective,
this makes sense as a sort of constructive intent: it is at least plausible that a
court or legislature aware of different approaches would decide to adopt the
modern learning. From another, it does not: it is precisely the older cases that
reflect the strongest commitment to territorial scope, and constructive intent is
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Restatement, the assertion rings increasingly false: territorialist
states mean what they say, and their choice-of-law rules cannot be
disregarded as misguided or quaint.
Von Mehren’s suggestion that courts could draw important
information from the choice-of-law rules of states that had adopted
a “functional” approach was offered in 1961 and bore at least a
tincture of the optimistic belief that all or most states would soon
welcome the new learning.173 Twenty years later, the Cramton,
Currie, and Kay casebook, with a mixture of wistfulness and irony,
labeled von Mehren’s hoped-for day the “Millennium”—the time
when all choice-of-law systems would be rational.174 The latest
version of the casebook drops that reference;175 the chronological
millennium has come and gone with no cleansing apocalypse. The
heresy of traditionalism persists—and that, as far as renvoi is
concerned, looks like the real end of the world.
But the lack of consensus need not thwart us. Conflicts
scholarship has made progress, though one might not think so from
reading the law reviews.176 The first significant step is the Legal
Realists’ claim that choice-of-law questions should not be treated
as esoterica but rather understood as conventional legal questions.
This insight promised release from the whirlpool of theory,177 if

not usually invoked to override explicit statements to the contrary. The
Supreme Court, for instance, has made clear that lower courts should not follow
a “constructive intent” to overturn live precedents. See Rodriquez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.”).
173
See von Mehren, supra note [], at 392-94.
174
See ROGER C. CRAMTON, DAVID P. CURRIE & HERMA HILL KAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 401 (3d ed. 1981).
175
See Currie, Kay & Kramer, supra note [], at 248-49.
176
See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note [multistate justice] at 146 (stating that
“the ferment in the United States has not produced anything truly novel” and
“the conflicts experiment conducted in the vast laboratory of the American
federal system has been a gigantic failure”).
177
It is a truism in conflicts that the same approaches recur. See Patrick J.
Borchers, Professor Brilmayer and the Holy Grail, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 465, 466
(“American conflicts scholars have a remarkable talent for reinventing the wheel
and claiming it as their own design”); Juenger, supra note [Century], at 90
(“there are … three, and only three, basic approaches to the choice-of-law
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one could only figure out what it meant to treat a conflicts question
as an ordinary legal one. The Realists did not; after making the
suggestion, they tended to fall back on vague admonitions to use
“the same methods actually used in deciding cases involving
purely domestic torts, contracts, property, etc.”178 Brainerd Currie
did; he recognized that conflicts is, in part, simply a matter of
determining the scope of state-created rights and that, to this
extent, it is the same task courts perform routinely in wholly
domestic cases.179
Given that insight, choice-of-law analysis can be described
as a relatively simple two-step process.180 First, a court must
determine which of the potentially relevant laws grant rights to the
parties.181 Doing so is a matter of consulting what I have called
“rules of scope.” Sometimes this step of the analysis will reveal
that only one law does so, in which case the court has discovered
what Currie called a false conflict and can enforce the rights
created by that law without further ado. And sometimes it will
reveal that more than one state’s law grants rights, and that the
rights created by the different states’ laws conflict. This would be
what Currie calls a true conflict, a case in which, for instance, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover according to State A law, but the
defendant is protected from liability according to State B law. In
such a case, the court must resort to a different sort of rule, what I

problem … [a]ll three [of which] have been present ever since the twelfth
century”).
178
Cook, supra note [], at 43.
179
See Currie, supra note [], at 183-84.
180
The model is developed most fully in Kramer, supra note [rethinking], at
291-318. Perry Dane offered a similar, less fully-articulated account in Dane,
supra note [] at 1250-51.
181
Here I switch from speaking about whether a law applies to whether the
law grants rights. This is commonplace in the domestic case: if we say that a
statute applies to a particular set of facts, what we mean is that it creates rights.
I have argued that this latter description is more useful for the conflicts context,
see Roosevelt, supra note [], at 2482-85, and I will show later why this is
especially true as far as renvoi is concerned. See infra Section III.B. Currie did
not free himself from the rhetoric of “applying law,” which is the cause of most
of his subsequent errors. See infra [discussion of unprovided-for case]. Kramer
has not abandoned the rhetoric entirely, though he does understand that the basic
issue is the scope of the laws, which is to say, the rights of the litigants. See
Kramer, supra note [rethinking], at 284 (describing “an inapplicable law” as “a
law that does not give plaintiff a right to relief”).
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will call a rule of priority,182 which tells it which of the conflicting
rights will prevail.
So far, so good, I hope. This description of the conflicts
problem should at least seem plausible. What I claim for it,
however, is more than plausibility, though less than any sort of
objective accuracy. My claim is that this model will allow us to do
conflicts analysis without the sorts of problems that plague the
conventional understanding—in particular, without the problem of
renvoi. Now it is time to prove that claim.
B.

Renvoi Within the Two-Step Model

Within the two-step model, renvoi does not exist. The
renvoi problem arises, recall, when the forum’s choice-of-law rules
instruct it to apply the law of another state, at which point it must
decide whether to apply the entirety of the other state’s law or its
internal law alone. But a court working within the two-step model
never decides to “apply” the law of either state; it simply ascertains
the existence of rights under the various states’ laws and then
resolves any conflicts.
This might seem simply a rhetorical move. Talking in
terms of identifying and enforcing rights rather than applying the
law of a state, one might think, cannot eliminate any real problems.
And that is true enough. What it can do, however, is to eliminate
problems that are not real, but are simply artifacts of the
conventional description. Within the two-step model, the insoluble
question of renvoi is disassembled into two discrete problems, each
of which can be solved.
1.

Ascertaining the Scope of Foreign Law

The first renvoi-related problem is how to determine the
scope of foreign law. More precisely, it is the question of whether
foreign choice-of-law rules should be consulted in order to do so.
This problem is relatively easy; the answer to the question is
182

In an earlier article I called these rules “conflicts rules,” in part to
suggest that these rules were the proper focus of the field misleadingly named
“choice of law.” See Roosevelt, supra note [], at 2468. Further thought,
inspired in part by David Franklin, has convinced me that “conflicts rules” is a
confusing name, and I renounce it.
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yes.183 Since the aim of the two-step model is to enforce rights
created by positive law, if the courts of a foreign state would find
that no rights exist under foreign law, the forum cannot disregard
that fact.184 State courts, after all, are authoritative with respect to
their own law, and the scope of foreign law is not a question of
forum law. No state, for instance, has the power to disregard an
explicit restriction on the scope of another state’s statute (as, for
instance, a provision allowing recovery only for wrongful death
“caused in this state”), and it has no more power to disregard
restrictions imposed by that state’s court of last resort.185 Thus if,
for example, Pennsylvania follows a territorialist approach, a New
York court attempting to determine whether Pennsylvania law
grants rights with respect to a transaction occurring in New York
must conclude that no Pennsylvania rights exist.186
The point may seem simple, but it has significant
consequences. The renvoi problem occurs, essentially, when
forum and foreign law differ as to their scopes: each state’s choiceof-law rules assert that rights are created by the law of the other
state, and not its own. Heeding both states’ laws produces the
infinite regress of renvoi, but ignoring the foreign choice-of-law
rules is impossible to justify. Recognizing that each state’s law is

183

At least, the problem is easy when considered explicitly from the proper
perspective. I earlier took a different perspective on the issue. See Roosevelt,
supra note [], at 2479 (“Choice of law rules are not rules of scope, and Currie
was right not to defer to them.”) The analysis I offered in support of that
assertion does not now seem to me adequate. Compare McGrath v. Kristensen,
340 U.S. 162, 178 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The matter does not appear
to me now as it appears to have appeared to me then”) (quoting Andrew v.
Styrap, 26 L.T.R.(N.S.) 704, 706).
184
I postpone a discussion of how this analysis works with regard to the
various choice-of-law systems considered earlier. How to decide what a foreign
choice-of-law rule means about the existence of foreign rights is slightly
complicated and requires a bit more exposition. The general point is simply that
foreign courts are authoritative with respect to foreign law, and choice-of-law
rules are, at least in part, about the scope of state law. That is uncontroversial
now, though it was not in the days of Swift v. Tyson.
185
See supra text accompanying notes [] to [].
186
In ascertaining the existence of Pennsylvania rights, the New York court
should also, of course, look to Pennsylvania law for a localizing rule, i.e., to
determine where, according to Pennsylvania law, the transaction occurs. More
generally, the New York court should ask whether a Pennsylvania court would
decide that Pennsylvania law reaches the transaction.
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authoritative as to its own scope (and not as to the scope of the
other state’s law) is the only workable solution. Perhaps not
coincidentally, it is also mandated by fundamental postulates of
our post-Erie jurisprudence.187
2.

The Problem of Mutual Deference

The second problem, and the closest analog to renvoi
proper, arises when a forum, after determining that conflicting
rights exist, looks to rules of priority to determine which rights
shall prevail. If each state’s rules of priority provide that the other
state’s rights should be given effect, the mutual deference creates a
situation that resembles renvoi.
This issue, too, can be handled with no fear of paradox, for
the resemblance is only superficial. The renvoi problem arises
when forum choice of law directs the court to follow foreign
choice-of-law rules and those foreign rules in turn direct adherence
to forum choice of law. Mutual deference with respect to rules of
priority creates no such circle, for a rule of priority instructs a court
to privilege either local or foreign substantive rights. It does not
refer to choice-of-law rules, neither rules of scope nor rules of
priority. The problem of mutual deference is not different in kind
from the conflict created when each state’s rule of priority provides
that its own rights should prevail.
The solution is the same in both cases, and it follows quite
simply from the recognition that while each state is authoritative
with respect to the scope of its own law, the question of what
happens when state laws conflict is not a question on which any
state can claim the last word. Thus while one state’s determination
as to the scope of its law must—as a question of that state’s law—
be respected in foreign courts, its resolution of conflicts between
its law and the laws of other states commands no such

187

I am not, it should be clear, arguing that foreign choice of law rules
should be heeded to the extent that they assert that some other state’s law
applies. Indeed, I am arguing the opposite: whether a particular state’s law
creates rights is a question of that state’s law and that state’s law alone. A
state’s choice-of-law rules, then, are authoritative on the question of whether
that state’s law creates rights, and irrelevant to the question of whether some
other state’s law does. See supra text accompanying notes [] to [].
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deference.188 Instead, state courts must follow the direction of
their legislature or court of last resort. That is, they must follow
their own rules of priority and enforce either local or foreign rights
as those rules dictate, regardless of contrary foreign rules of
priority.189
3.

Understanding Assimilation

One puzzle remains. It is not an inherent part of the
analysis under the two-step model, but because it resembles renvoi,
it merits a brief discussion. It arises when the forum chooses to
incorporate part of the law of another state, i.e., when it adopts
what I have referred to as a rule of assimilation.
Assimilation occurs whenever a state decides to build upon
the legal relations created by another. Suppose, for instance, that
Connecticut refuses to recognize same-sex marriages solemnized
in other states. Connecticut law might nonetheless provide that for
certain incidents of marriage—for example, the right to make
decisions about medical care for an incompetent spouse—it will
188

See Kramer, supra note [renvoi] at 1029 (“No state’s rule has a
privileged status from this multilateral perspective”); Roosevelt, supra note [], at
2533 (“The principle that states are co-equal sovereigns leads to no other
conclusion”).
189
I reached the same conclusion in Roosevelt, supra note [], at 2533-34.
Kramer suggests that in such cases courts should reconsider the matter and feel
free to enforce rights under their own law if that would make both states better
off. See Kramer, supra note [renvoi], at 1032-34. I am skeptical of such
freedom. In the simple case, in which the forum’s rule of priority simply
provides that local rights shall yield, I do not see how a court can claim the
power to disregard this provision of its own law. Matters can be complicated;
we could imagine a rule of priority stating that local rights shall yield, given a
particular constellation of facts, unless the foreign rule of priority directs that
foreign rights yield. (We are approaching a renvoi-type circle here, but there is
no paradox yet. As long as the local rule of priority does not instruct the court to
follow the foreign rule of priority, there is no danger of infinite regress—and a
rule of priority that did so provide would be an example of legislative
perversity.) I believe that such a rule would be constitutionally doubtful,
however, because it would privilege local rights in a case featuring particular
contacts, and again in a case in which those contacts were switched (what I have
called a “mirror-image” case). This amounts to the sort of discrimination
against foreign law that the Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibits. See
generally Roosevelt, supra note [], at 2528-29 (discussing Full Faith and Credit
and mirror image cases).
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look to domiciliary law, rather than Connecticut law, to determine
who is a “spouse” entitled to make such decisions. In according
such rights to one member of a Massachusetts same-sex couple,
Connecticut is not enforcing Massachusetts rights. It is employing
Massachusetts law in a definitional, rather than a substantive,
capacity—to identify rights-bearers rather than to determine their
rights. Consequently, as Currie recognized, there is no need to
consider limitations Massachusetts might place on the scope of its
rights, and in such cases foreign choice-of-law rules can be
ignored.190
IV.

CONVENTIONALISM RECONSIDERED
A. Conventional Approaches Within the Two-Step
Model

It is possible, then, to conceptualize the choice-of-law task
in a manner that does not raise the problem of renvoi. That should
go some ways towards demonstrating that the problem is an
artifact of the conventional conflicts perspective, an assertion I will
develop more fully later. But the point of this article is not to
devise an approach that avoids renvoi, and indeed the value of the
two-step model is not that it is a distinctive approach to conflicts.
The point is to identify the fundamental error within the
conventional perspective, and to this end the two-step model is
most useful as an analytical tool. I have not, after all, specified any
of the rules of scope or rules of priority that are to be used.
Specifying those rules produces a particular conflicts approach,
and by using appropriate rules, any of the conventional approaches
can be described within the two-step model. Given such
specification, the model allows us to examine the conventional
approaches in a more analytically tractable way. In particular, as
we shall see, it allows us to describe these approaches in a manner
in which the renvoi problem does not arise, and hence to gain a
deeper understanding of the nature of the problem. The first step
towards that understanding is to depict the conventional
approaches within the model.

190

For Currie’s recognition of the difference between assimilation and
choice of law, see Currie, supra note [], at 69-73, 178.
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The Traditional Approach

The traditional approach holds that a state’s law governs all
events, and only those events, that occur within the state.191 That
is, it holds that state laws are territorial in scope. Given this
premise, and applying localizing rules to determine a single
location for events extended across borders, there is no possibility
for conflict between laws: one and only law will attach legal
consequences to a transaction. With such a powerful rule of scope,
the traditional approach did not need rules of priority, and indeed it
does not contain them. Traditionalism, then, is easy to describe
within the two-step model: it has a territorial rule of scope and no
rules of priority.192
2.

Interest Analysis

Interest analysis uses the concept of an interest as a means
of delimiting the scope of state law. If it would further a law’s
purposes to bring a transaction within its scope, the law is
construed to extend to that transaction. Because this method of
determining scope does not necessarily allocate legislative
jurisdiction to a single state, interest analysis, as the traditional
approach did not, confronts the possibility of conflict. If two states
191

See Beale, supra note [], at 46 (“By its very nature law must apply to
everything and must exclusively apply to everything within the boundary of its
jurisdiction.”).
192
A reliance on rules of scope alone might seem inadequate to handle the
situation in which territorialism encounters a different choice-of-law approach.
Then, one might think, conflicts arise and cannot be ignored. In fact, conflicts
can arise even between territorialist courts, for each court might, for reasons of
characterization or substantive law, believe that its state wielded territorial
authority. Territorialism resolves both these problems in essentially the same
way, by allowing forum law to determine the scope of foreign law. If forum
rules of scope are imposed on foreign law, no conflict can arise. This move is,
of course, illegitimate, as I have suggested already and discuss further below.
See supra [], infra []. For this reason, it might be more accurate to treat
traditionalism as including an implicit rule of priority favoring whatever law is
deemed territorially appropriate. See Kramer, supra note [renvoi] at 1039 (“By
definition, the direction to apply [a state’s] law means both that [that state]
confers a right (the first step) and that it enforces this right notwithstanding the
concurrent applicability of another state’s law (the second step)”).
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are both interested in a transaction, both laws are construed to
attach legal consequences, and if the laws differ in substance, a
conflict exists. Currie was thus forced to create a rule of priority,
which he did via the principle that in case of a true conflict the
forum should apply its own law.193 Interest analysis can thus be
redescribed within the two-step model as using state interests to
determine scope and forum preference as a rule of priority.
3.

The Second Restatement

The Second Restatement differs starkly from both the
traditional approach and interest analysis in that it does not contain
any means of limiting the class of states whose laws might
potentially extend to a transaction.
Any state is eligible to
compete for the title of most significantly related. From the
perspective of the two-step model, this means that the Second
Restatement contains no rules of scope. Consequently, all the
work is done by the diffuse and comprehensive rule of priority
contained in section 6. It is because of the absence of rules of
scope that I have included the Second Restatement despite its
failure to engage renvoi in a theoretical manner: the Restatement
completes the picture by providing an example of a system that
works solely via rules of priority.
4.

Testing the Redescription

The following table summarizes the results of the preceding
analysis.

Rule of Scope

Traditionalism
Territoriality

193

Interest Analysis
Existence of Interest

Currie did not, of course, consider this rule of priority a solution; he
thought that true conflicts were at bottom insoluble. See Currie, supra note [], at
169 (“[The resort to forum law] is not an ideal; it is simply the best that is
available.”). Modern theory has generally rejected Currie’s forum preference
and developed a number of more sophisticated approaches to true conflicts.
Indeed, Currie himself later offered more refinement; he suggested that after
detecting a true conflict, the forum should attempt a “moderate and restrained”
interpretation of the two states’ policies in an effort to eliminate the conflict.
See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. & Contemp. Probs
754, 757 (1963).
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Forum Preference

Describing the leading approaches to choice of law in terms
of rules of scope and rules of priority accomplishes several goals.
By viewing them within the same analytical framework, we are
better positioned to see the similarities between what might
otherwise seem radically different approaches, and differences
between ones that might seem similar. Currie’s version of interest
analysis and the traditional approach, for instance, are quite
similar; each relies primarily on rules of scope and has at best a
rudimentary conflicts rule. (Currie, notably, did not conceive of
interest analysis as a method of resolving conflicts but rather a
means to identify cases in which no conflict existed.194) The
Second Restatement, in sharp contrast, makes no attempt to
segregate out cases in which the litigated transaction falls outside
the scope of one state’s law.195 All its energies are expended on
resolving conflicts via its rule of priority.
Additionally, and more important for this article,
redescription allows us to identify and distinguish rules of scope
and rules of priority within each approach. The distinction is vital
because questions of scope and questions of priority are very
different in terms of the issues over which a particular state may
claim final authority. As already noted, the scope of a state’s law
is a matter very much within the authority of that state’s courts and
legislature. The priority given to its law in conflicts with the law
of other states is not, and this difference is essential to
understanding the renvoi problem.
The value of the redescription, however, depends crucially
(if unsurprisingly) on its accuracy. The goal of this section is to
demonstrate that the approaches considered, properly understood,
194

See Currie, supra note [], at 107 (distinguishing between false conflicts,
which “present no real conflicts problem” and true conflicts, which “cannot be
solved by any science or method of conflict of laws” and should therefore be
decided under forum law) (emphasis in original).
195
The Second Restatement, uncompromising in its ecumenicalism,
includes interest analysis as a factor, see § 6, and territorialist principles in its
presumptions. See Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting that “the simple old rules can be glimpsed through modernity’s fog,
though spectrally thinned to presumptions”). Consequently, in some hands, it
may resemble scope analysis.
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do not produce the renvoi problem. If I have erred in my
characterizations of the theories, then the demonstration is of little
import. It is thus worth pausing to consider whether the two-step
models set out above are indeed true to the approaches they
represent.
The traditional approach presents the easiest case. There is
little doubt that traditionalists conceived of territorialism as a rule
of scope. Beale was emphatic that territorial boundaries constitute
limits to legislative jurisdiction,196 and courts of the territorialist
era issued equally forceful pronouncements.197
Confidence about the characterization of interest analysis is
somewhat harder to come by. There are doubtless those who
would deny that the determination that a state is interested is
tantamount to a conclusion that a transaction falls within the scope
196

See 1 Beale, supra note [], at 46. “[N]ot only must the law extend over
the whole territory subject to it and apply to every act done there, but only one
law can so apply. If two laws were present at the same time and in the same
place upon the same subject we should also have a condition of anarchy. By its
very nature law must apply to everything and must exclusively apply to
everything within the boundary of its jurisdiction.” Interestingly, or perhaps
puzzlingly, Kramer disagrees, suggesting that the First Restatement
contemplated overlapping legislative jurisdiction and that in fact territorialism
should be understood as a rule of priority. See Kramer, supra note [renvoi], at
1042 & n.197, accord Cheatham, supra note [], at 383. I do not think Beale’s
treatise supports this assertion; the section Kramer refers to argues that different
states could impose sanctions, by statute, for a nucleus of acts and consequences
crossing state lines. But his reasoning here appears to be that each state is
regulating based on the acts or consequences within its borders—that is, he
grants that states can, by statute, impose liability for what would be an
incomplete tort at common law. This does not suggest that states can regulate
acts outside their borders or that legislative jurisdiction can overlap. See 1
Beale, supra note [], § 65.2 at 315 (stating that with respect to a series of events
crossing state lines, “either of these states has jurisdiction to make that one of
the series of events which took place in that state the basis of a right”) (emphasis
added). It is because such legislation would create causes of action unknown to
the common law that Beale in this section sharply distinguished the two. The
reasoning is not especially satisfying; one might wonder why under this theory
the state in which the act is performed can do more than treat it as an attempt,
and the state in which the consequence occurs do more than treat it as uncaused,
a question Beale did not attempt to answer. The First Restatement, though less
clearly, seems to be applying the same principle. See Restatement, First, of
Conflict of Laws § 65 at 97-98 (extending legislative jurisdiction to states “in
which any event in the series of act and consequences occurs”).
197
See Carroll, 11 So. at 807.
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of its relevant law.
This article is not an exercise in Currie
hermeneutics, and I would be content to demonstrate that the
model I have arrived at is a plausible method of operationalizing
Currie’s basic insights.
There are, I believe, adequate reasons to think so. First, the
redescription given captures Currie’s results. A court should
never, Currie believed, apply the law of an uninterested state.198
This is consistent with, indeed equivalent to, the conclusion that a
lack of interest indicates that the transaction falls outside the scope
of the state’s law.199 Conversely, Currie understood the existence
of an interest as an indication that the state’s law did attach legal
consequences to the transaction; it is for this reason that the
presence of two interests backing substantively different rules of
law produced a conflict. Second, not only does the redescription
produce the same results reached by Currie, it fits with his
writings. Currie repeatedly characterized his method as akin to
conventional statutory construction.200
If the choice-of-law
methodology is essentially interpretation of the substantive laws at
issue, its result will be—as in the marginal domestic case—a
conclusion as to the scope of the interpreted law.201 The rule of
priority I have selected, as already noted, represents Currie’s
earlier thinking, and has not been followed by most of the
jurisdictions purporting to apply interest analysis. Its content is not
especially important for the analysis that follows, however, and its
use may be justified on the grounds of simplicity.
As for the Second Restatement, the open texture that makes
it difficult to be clearly correct or incorrect in application also

198

The exceptions, in Currie’s formulation of the theory, are the
unprovided-for case and, in some circumstances, cases litigated in a
disinterested forum. See Currie, supra note [], at []. As discussed more fully
infra [], I believe Kramer is correct in arguing that Currie erred in his analysis of
the unprovided-for case and that such cases should be understood as ones in
which neither state’s law grants the plaintiff a right to recover. In such
circumstances, the appropriate resolution is simply dismissal of the suit; the
question of which law “applies” is a misleading distraction. See infra [].
199
Currie’s language suggests as much: in order to assess the results of
interest analysis in his analysis of married women’s contracts, he rephrased them
in the language of explicit conflict of laws provisions setting out the scope of
various state laws. See Currie, supra note [], at 111-16.
200
See id. at 184-85, 364-65.
201
Id. at 184.
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poses some problems for characterization. The centerpiece Section
6 directs courts to consider, inter alia, the policies of the forum and
other interested states, a description that could be taken to suggest
that uninterested states have (somehow) been excluded from the
analysis at an earlier stage. But since the Restatement does not
indicate how this exclusion is to be performed, it seems justified to
treat it as essentially a priority-based approach.
B. Renvoi and
Reconsidered

the

Conventional

Approaches

All three of these choice-of-law systems suffer from a
common defect.
The defect is what I will call “scope
imperialism.” It consists in the substitution of forum rules of scope
for foreign rules. Each of the systems described above has a
particular rule of scope. (The lack of a rule, as in the Second
Restatement, simply amounts to a permissive rule: no states are to
be excluded as a matter of scope analysis.) A jurisdiction that
adopts such a system adopts its associated rule of scope with
respect to its own law. But courts applying the system apply the
rule of scope not only to local law, but to foreign law as well. This
produces a conflict (though not one that the conventional approach
acknowledges), for some foreign states will have adopted different
systems, with different rules of scope. States will thus disagree
with others about the scope of their respective laws, and under the
conventional approach, each state will use its own rules of scope to
ascertain not only the limits of its own law, but the limits of the
laws of other states as well.202
Traditionalism and interest analysis are imperialist in what
could be termed both negative and positive senses. They will
refuse to recognize the existence of foreign rights in cases in which
foreign courts would, and they will “recognize” such rights when

202

A slightly different, and even more dramatic, form of imperialism arises
with respect to characterization or differences in substantive law. If a foreign
state defines acceptance differently from the forum (recall the mailbox rule
example discussed supra text accompanying notes [] to []), it may be that no
contract has been formed within its borders, as a matter of its internal law. A
territorialist forum deciding that foreign law nonetheless “applies” on the basis
of its own rules about the time and place of acceptance has privileged provisions
of its substantive contract law over those of the foreign state.
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foreign courts would not. (Such cases will arise, for instance,
when a traditionalist court applies the law of a state that follows
interest analysis on the grounds that a tort occurred within that
state, despite the fact that courts of that state would find no
interest. Similarly, most interest analysts would apply the law of a
traditionalist state to a tort claim if they found it interested,
regardless of whether the tort occurred outside the state.) Because
the Second Restatement places no limits on scope, its imperialism
is positive only; it will find foreign rights that do not exist
according to foreign courts. (A Second Restatement court, for
instance, might find that a traditionalist state had the most
significant relationship to an issue in a tort claim arising out of
state, and it would at least consider that state in making its most
significant relationship determination.)
Scope imperialism should be familiar; it is the practice that
underlies the appeal to objectivity. And as discussed at length in
the context of that move, it is untenable. State courts and
legislatures are authoritative with respect to the scope of their own
law.203 The point of the redescription is to show that the choice-oflaw rules of the conventional approaches do amount in part to rules
of scope. Once this is granted, it follows that even under the
conventional approaches, disregard of foreign choice-of-law rules
is impermissible and must be renounced. But the renunciation is in
fact a victory. Abandoning imperialist designs does not weaken
the systems; instead, it allows us to see how renvoi should be
resolved within them. And ultimately, it will give us a clearer
picture of the nature of the problem.
1. Renvoi Within Systems
a. The Traditional Approach
Renvoi within the traditional system occurs when each
state’s law provides that rights vest not within its territory but
within the territory of the other state. Consider, for example, a tort
suit in which the internal laws of the two states differ as to the
elements of the cause of action, with each finding that the crucial
last act necessary to the vesting of a right occurs in the other state.
203

See supra text accompanying notes [] to [].
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The courts of State A will thus rule that State B law applies, and
vice versa.
What are we to make of this difference of opinion? The
conventional understanding takes the determination that the last act
occurs in another state as a direction to apply that state’s law,
which leads into the renvoi problem. But having redescribed the
traditional approach within the two-step model, we no longer
confront a step at which we are instructed to “apply” some state’s
law. We are simply asking whether rights exist, and then resolving
any conflicts that arise. In the case posited, each state’s courts will
conclude that no rights exist under their own law, but that rights do
exist under the law of the other state.
This is again a difference of opinion, but the two-step
model has transformed it into one that can be resolved. Each
state’s courts are authoritative as to the scope of their own law, and
powerless as to the scope of other states’ laws. Thus the State A
determination that no rights exist under A law binds the State B
court, and vice versa. A traditionalist court’s conclusion that
rights vest under foreign law is simple scope imperialism, and if
the foreign court disagrees, its view must prevail. The hypothetical
tort case falls within the scope of neither state’s law.
In the conventional conflicts vocabulary, this amounts to a
determination that neither state’s law applies. So phrased, the
conclusion is not novel. Over a century ago, John Westlake
asserted that “a rule referring to a foreign law should be
understood as referring to the whole of that law, necessarily
including the limits which it sets to its own application, without a
regard to which it would not really be that law which was applied”
and described renvoi as a situation in which “neither … lawgiver
has claimed authority.”204
Westlake’s premise for this argument was the same one for
which I have argued in this Article, that choice-of-law rules
amount to substantive limits on the scope of a state’s law.205 His
204

JOHN WESTLAKE, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (7th
ed. 1925). The first edition of the treatise was published 1858. Id. at ii. Bate
dates Westlake’s acceptance of renvoi to his 1900 contribution to the
discussions of the Institute on International Law. See John Pawley Bate, Notes
on the Doctrine of Renvoi in Private International Law 57 (1904).
205
See Westlake, supra note [], at 29, 38 (criticizing those who would
ignore foreign choice-of-law rules as neglecting “the element of the authority
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analysis differs from mine in that he remained within the
conventional understanding, on which the task of a court engaged
in choice of law is to determine which state’s law applies. From
this perspective, “no state’s law” is not an answer but a gap in the
theory, and just as Brainerd Currie would fifty-odd years later,
Westlake filled the gap with forum law.206
From the conventional perspective, it may indeed make
some sense to suppose that one cannot rest with the conclusion that
a transaction falls outside the scope of both states’ laws. The aim
of the conventional choice of law analysis is to select a law
according to which the case will be decided, and if no law is
selected, scholars believed, the case cannot be decided. Some law
must therefore be applied, and if no other presents itself, forum law
is the only recourse.207

claimed by the lawgiver” and describing such rules as “the limits which [the
law] sets to its own application”).
206
See id. at 29 (characterizing renvoi as a situation in which “the conflict
of rules of private international law has had for its consequence that they lead to
no result”); Lorenzen, supra note [Columbia] at 202 (describing conclusion of
Westlake and von Bar that “the judge of the forum, being under an obligation to
render a decision in the case, has no recourse except that of applying the lex
fori”). Westlake’s foreshadowing of Currie goes further; his argument was
driven by the insight that there is no sharp distinction between choice of law and
internal law, precisely the claim that Currie would later make the centerpiece of
his interest analysis. See Currie, supra note [], at 183-84 (describing resolution
of multistate cases as similar to that of “marginal domestic situations”); Kramer,
supra note [rethinking], at 290-92 (pointing out similarities in analysis of
conflicts cases and domestic cases). In his assertion that choice-of-law rules
place limits on the scope of internal law, Westlake in fact anticipated a central
theme of the analysis of Brilmayer and Kramer. The clairvoyance earned him a
scolding from Lorenzen, who pronounced the “assertion that the legislator in
adopting a rule of internal law in reality defined its operation in space by the
corresponding rule of Private International Law” “an absurdity.” See Lorenzen,
supra note [Columbia], at 203.
207
The idea that the choice-of-law analysis must end in the identification of
a law that applies was apparently unquestioned in the traditionalist era. As the
preceding note indicates, Westlake, von Bar, and Lorenzen all believed that if
the analysis did not so terminate, application of forum law was the only possible
response. See also, e.g., Schreiber, supra note [], at 530 (“There is here,
therefore, a legal vacuum or gap, which must be bridged over, and which is
bridged over by applying the law of the forum as such: otherwise no decision
could be reached in the case.”).
Beale likewise warned that “[a] hiatus or
vacuum in the law would mean anarchy.” 1 Beale, supra note [], at 45. As the
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Again, describing the case within the two-step model
avoids these difficulties. That the tort does not fall within the
scope of either state’s law does not mean that the case cannot be
decided. It simply means that the plaintiff has no rights to invoke,
and his suit should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
This result will surely seem unfortunate. The plaintiff has,
after all, suffered a tort according to the internal law of each state,
and it makes little sense that he cannot recover simply because the
events constituting the tort straddle state lines. But what this
apparent failure of the system suggests is simply that rigid
territorialism is not a very sensible rule of scope.208 It does not
suggest that states do, or even should, have the power to disregard
sister-state determinations that sister-state law does not reach a
particular transaction.
b. Interest Analysis
Renvoi within interest analysis is controversial; as we have
already seen, Currie believed that his approach eliminated the
problem. Indeed, conventional interest analysis would view renvoi
as a false conflict, the easiest sort of case to resolve. Renvoi,
within interest analysis, arises when each state court determines
that its state is not interested, but the other state is.209 Because

following section will discuss in more detail, this precise pattern of scholarship
repeated itself many years later in the context of interest analysis.
208
Beale seemed at least partially aware of the problem; he suggested that
in cases where the elements of a tort occurred on different sides of a state line,
each state legislature could assert jurisdiction on the basis of the occurrences
within its border. See 1 Beale, supra note [], § 65.2 at 315 (stating that with
respect to a series of events crossing state lines, “either of these states has
jurisdiction to make that one of the series of events which took place in that state
the basis of a right”). As a practical matter, this comes perilously close to
recognizing overlapping legislative jurisdiction, and Cheatham (and later
Kramer) both read Beale to have done so. See Cheatham, supra note [], at 383;
Kramer, supra note [renvoi] at 1042 & n.197. As discussed supra note [], I
believe they miss a distinction Beale attempted to maintain between regulating a
single act and regulating a series of acts ands consequences. In their defense, I
venture the observation that the distinction is sufficiently implausible that
overlooking it might be the most charitable treatment.
209
The transjurisdictional tort used as example in the previous section will
not necessarily produce such a case. The easiest way to think about a renvoi
between two states following interest analysis is simply to suppose that, for
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conventional interest analysis tends to privilege the forum’s
assessment of sister-state interests over the assessments of the
courts of that state, it will conclude that only one state (the foreign
state) is interested.
But if, as I have argued, the determination of interest is in
fact a conclusion about the scope of state law, it is again a
conclusion each state has the authority to make with respect to its
own law, and no other. Thus, each state’s assessment that it is not
interested must be accepted by the other. Conversely, each state’s
assessment of the other’s interest must be disregarded as scope
imperialism. The correct conclusion is that neither state is
interested: neither state’s law grants the plaintiff rights.
Within the traditional system, such a case might be
described as one that falls into the gap between jurisdictions.
Within interest analysis, a name exists already: renvoi is simply a
special instance of the unprovided-for case.210 Currie found the
unprovided case troubling; like Westlake before him, he was
unwilling to accept the conclusion that in some cases neither
state’s law would govern the transaction. And like Westlake,
Currie suggested that in an unprovided-for case the forum should
apply its own law, apparently on the theory that otherwise it would
be impossible to reach a decision.211

whatever reason, the State A court’s analysis indicates that State A is not
interested but State B is, while the B court’s analysis indicates the reverse.
210
I say “special instance” because the unprovided-for case will arise
whenever neither state is interested. Renvoi requires in addition that each state
conclude the other is interested. As the text explains, however, this conclusion
is beyond the power of state courts and can be disregarded. Renvoi thus should
be analyzed like any other unprovided-for case.
211
This “solution” has an undeniable odor of ad-hocery, and critics of
interest analysis seized on the unprovided-for case as indicative of serious
problems with the theory. David Cavers commented that such mutual deference
seemed to create “a gap in the law—a case fallen between the stools of two legal
systems” and suggested that it would cause problems for interest analysis. See
Cavers, supra note [choice-of-law process] at 105-06. Other reactions were
stronger. See, e.g., Aaron Twerski, Neumier v. Kuehner: Where are the
Emperor’s Clothes, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 104, 107-08 (1973) (arguing that “interest
analysis met its Waterloo with the advent of the unprovided-for case” and
“[o]nly the almost mesmerizing effect of the brilliant Currie writing [prevented
his discussion of such cases] from being subjected to the strongest ridicule”).
From the conventional perspective, the reaction is understandable: if the point of
choice of law is to identify the law that applies, the unprovided-for case looks
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Such perfect duplication of the preceding generation’s
theoretical moves gives support to those who argue that conflicts
scholarship moves only in circles.212 The argument can be
rebutted in this case, however, for Larry Kramer subsequently took
up the question and argued that the correct resolution of a truly
unprovided-for case is the dismissal described in the previous
section.213 This is, I think, an undeniable advance. It is frequently
the case that no law gives the plaintiff a right to recover, and the
conclusion neither produces anarchy nor prevents decision. The
inability of Beale, Westlake and Currie to recognize this
commonplace fact stems from their shared premise that the
purpose of choice of law is to identify the law that applies to a
transaction, and the concomitant belief that some law must
apply.214 But if we consider the choice-of-law analysis as simply a
process of first ascertaining the parties’ rights and then resolving
any conflicts between them—that is to say, if we employ the same
methodology used to resolve domestic cases—the possibility that
no law “applies” is untroubling, indeed, entirely banal.
c. The Second Restatement

like a failure. But as the text discusses, the two-step model resolves the
problem; the only failure is the belief that some law must “apply.”
212
See, e.g., Juenger, supra note [71] at 113 (“To be sure, as far as novelty
is concerned, one can hardly expect it from any conflicts scholar considering
that the three possible choice-of-law approaches have been known since the
days of the statutists.”)
213
See Kramer, supra note [unprovided-for], at [].
214
Conceptually, the problem here is that describing the choice-of-law
question as “What law applies?” has led scholars to conflate two different senses
in which X law might “apply.” In the first sense, we mean that the court will
decide the case according to X law. In the second, we mean that the X law
attaches legal consequences to the transaction: it gives one or the other party
rights. The unprovided-for case (and the renvoi, as a special instance) arises
when neither law attaches legal consequences. The correct conclusion here is
simply that the plaintiff cannot recover. It is of no moment what law is
“applied” in the first sense, just as it is of no moment whether a court “applies”
one of two statutes neither of which gives a right to recover. The common
mistake of Currie and Beale—and even of Westlake—is to think that a
conclusion that no law “applies” in the second sense has some consequence for a
court’s ability to decide the case.
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Within the Second Restatement, renvoi occurs when each
state’s court believes that the other state has a more significant
relationship. Because the Second Restatement works via rules of
priority rather than rules of scope, the problem takes a somewhat
different form within the two-step model. Each state’s law,
according to the courts of that state, brings the transaction within
its scope, but each is willing to yield to the law of the other state.
This problem should also be familiar; it is the problem of
mutual deference, which has been raised and resolved earlier.
Foreign rules of scope must be heeded, I have said, but foreign
rules of priority need not be. Which of two state laws should yield
when they conflict is not a matter of setting the scope of state law,
and hence not a question on which one state can bind the courts of
another. It is forum rules of priority that bind the forum, and they
must be followed. Consequently, each state should decide the case
under the internal law of the other state, in obedience to its own
rules of priority.215
2. Renvoi Across Systems
Within the two-step model, the renvoi problem is no more
difficult across systems than within them. For courts that follow
interest analysis or the traditional approach, renvoi arises only
when neither state’s law grants rights. Again, each state’s
determination as to the scope of its law should be heeded, and its
determination as to the scope of the other state’s law should be
disregarded. A renvoi between an interest analysis and a
traditionalist court is again simply a situation in which no law
gives the plaintiff a right to recover.
When traditionalism or interest analysis confronts the
Second Restatement, the problem is again slightly more complex.
In such a case, the law of the traditionalist or interest analysis state
does not, by its terms, include the transaction within its scope. The
law of the Second Restatement state does, but it prescribes that

215

Kramer disagrees, as discussed supra note []. I think that the conclusion
follows from straightforward positivism—forum rules of priority are binding on
forum courts—and also serves the constitutional purpose of preventing states
from discriminating against foreign law. See Roosevelt, supra note [], at 253334.
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rights created by its law should yield to contrary rights created by
foreign law.
How is this problem to be resolved? Once again, the
distinction between rules of scope and rules of priority shows the
way—though this time by a slightly different path. Rules of scope,
I have said, are about the existence or non-existence of rights,
while rules of priority deal with the question of which rights
should be given precedence. A rule of priority directing that local
rights should yield to foreign rights does not tell the court to
“apply” foreign law, and if no foreign rights exist, the local rights
should be given effect. Thus the case should be decided in
accordance with the law of the Second Restatement state.
V.

RESOLVING RENVOI

What this redescription has shown is that renvoi does not,
or need not, exist either within or between any of the conventional
approaches to choice of law. And it has shown something more.
The reason that the renvoi problem arises is that the conventional
approaches assume that the scope of foreign law can be determined
by the forum’s choice-of-law rules. That is, they assume that
forum law can determine not merely whether forum law grants
rights to the parties, but whether foreign law does as well. That
they assume this is unsurprising; the idea is the basic starting point
for conventional choice-of-law analysis. The whole point of a
choice-of-law system, after all, is to determine when some other
state’s law applies. As Lorenzen put it, “The object of the science
of the Private International Law of a particular country is to fix the
limits of the application of the territorial law of such country, but
its aim is not restricted to this. It includes also the determination of
the foreign law applicable in those cases in which the lex fori does
not control.”216
But the idea that forum law can decide this second issue, as
I have argued, is mistaken in two ways. First, it is an
unconstitutional usurpation of authority, a denial of the basic
proposition that a state’s courts have the last word on the meaning
of their own law.217 And second, it is unhelpful; it produces the

216
217

Lorenzen, supra note [Columbia], at 204.
See supra text accompanying notes [] to [].
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renvoi problem, and others.218 Conflicts will not advance until it
frees itself from the vocabulary that presses this idea on us, what I
have elsewhere called the rhetoric of choice.219
There are, I have suggested, good reasons to do so. The
rhetoric of choice—the suggestion that forum law can determine
the scope of foreign law—overstates the forum’s ability to
disregard foreign determinations that foreign law does reach a
transaction, hiding conflicts behind the veil of choice.220
Additionally, as argued in this article, it overstates the forum’s
ability to disregard foreign determinations that foreign law does
not reach a transaction, the problem inherent in those decisions
rejecting renvoi. But hiding the difficulties of conflicts does not
make them go away; it simply causes them to reappear in different
form.
There are also what might seem to be costs. Chief among
them is the abandonment of the fundamental aspiration of the field
of conflict of laws. If what I have said is correct, it demonstrates
that choice-of-law rules cannot resolve the very question that
called them into being. Thus, what I recommend is in a certain
sense the death of choice of law.221
This will surely strike some as shocking.222 Overcoming a
problem by calling for the elimination of the field of law designed
to solve it is not the conventional understanding of a theoretical
advance; it is more like prescribing the guillotine as a headache
remedy. But it is hardly unprecedented. Currie himself wrote that

218

At a higher level of generality, we could say that the problem lies in
framing the choice-of-law question in terms of what law “applies” in the first
place. For an explanation of the problems this formulation has caused for the
analysis of renvoi and the unprovided for case, see note [], supra.
219
See Roosevelt, supra note [], at 2453.
220
See id. at 2465. The failure of modern choice-of-law theory to address
existing conflicts is a theme of much of Joseph Singer’s work, though his
analysis differs from mine in significant respects. See, e.g., Joseph Singer, A
Pragmatic Approach to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L.Rev. 731 (1990); Joseph Singer,
Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
221
Only a certain sense, because there remains the considerable task of
crafting rules of scope and priority.
222
Though not, presumably, those who have already read the field its last
rites. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev.
1403, 1407 (1996) (stating that “choice of law is dead, killed by a realism
intended to save it”).
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“the system itself is at fault,”223 and others took him to be
advocating a very similar abandonment of the venture.224 In fact,
the idea that conflicts should return from its self-imposed exile and
rejoin the body of ordinary legal analysis is a staple of the
literature.225 The real question is not whether this reconciliation is
desirable; it is why it has not yet occurred.
The most obvious reason is that the conventional
understanding made good sense in Joseph Beale’s day.226 Armed
with the general common law, a court could confidently identify
the last act necessary to the vesting of rights, and given
territorialism’s status as part of the nature of law, it could indeed
decide which state’s law applied to a transaction. Modern choiceof-law theory no longer sets out to identify a single state with
authority to regulate, but it has retained much of Beale’s
vocabulary and conceptual framework, even while discarding his
methodology. In particular, it has retained the central idea that
forum law can determine whether foreign law “applies” or does
not.
Forum law cannot do this; indeed, though the determination
might have seemed possible in Beale’s day, the lesson of Erie is
that it never was. Choice of law, understood as a body of forum
223

Currie, supra note [], at 185. Currie made this observation, moreover, in
response to the anticipated criticism that “it is no great trick to dispose of the
characteristic problems of a system by destroying the system itself.” Ibid.
224
Kegel remarked that “Since the applicability of domestic substantive law
is determined by its construction and interpretation, the body of law which we
formerly knew as Conflict of Laws disappears! It fades into substantive law
and, on issues involving constitutionality, into constitutional law.” The Crisis in
Conflict of Laws, 112 Collected Courses 91, 115 (1964).
225
Russell Weintraub, for example, has argued that “the conflict of laws
should join the mainstream of legal reasoning.” Russell Weintraub, A Defense
of Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws and the Use of That Analysis in
Products Liability Cases, 46 Ohio St. L. J. 493, 493 (1985). Walter Wheeler
Cook, as already noted, urged rather vaguely that conflicts cases should be
resolved by the ordinary tools of legal analysis. See Cook, supra note [], at 43.
And Currie’s basic insight, at least as Kramer and I understand him, is that
choice-of-law analysis is not different in kind from the ordinary process of
deciding whether a state’s law applies to a marginal domestic case. See Currie,
supra note [], at 183-84; Kramer, supra note [renvoi] at 1005.
226
It also makes some sense in the international context, where authoritative
rules regarding the treatment of other countries’ law are hard to find. It does not
make sense in the modern United States, where such questions are governed by
the Constitution.
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law that can tell a court which foreign law to apply, is a phantasm.
But it is a powerful one, and strong spirits leave hangovers in their
wake. What conflicts currently suffers from is just that—the
aftereffects of an overindulgence in metaphysics. Implicit in the
conventional vocabulary of choice of law is a mistaken conception
of the nature of the task and of the authority of forum law. That is
the picture that has held us captive; that is the ambition we must
renounce.
CONCLUSION
Choice of law, as conventionally understood, has set itself
an impossible task. The basic picture animating the venture—that
a forum can consult its own law to determine whether a foreign
state’s law applies—ignores or defies the fundamental precept that
state courts and legislatures are authoritative with respect to the
scope of their own law. That error is embedded as deeply as can
be—it is the starting point and basic postulate of all conventional
choice-of-law theories. In the same way that a faulty axiom will
produce paradoxes in a logical system, this error creates ripples on
the surface of the theory, and renvoi is one of those.
Renvoi, as I have analyzed it, arises when each state
contradicts the other as to the scope of their respective laws. The
conventional understanding asserts that states do have authority to
determine the scope of other states’ laws, but that postulate leads
naturally to the paradoxical infinite regress: if states have this
power, each should be able to exercise it. Thus, if State A law
asserts that State B law applies, and State B law that A law applies,
the conventional understanding takes each assertion as legitimate
and does not allow us to pick between them.
What I have argued is that a different approach, which
takes neither assertion as legitimate, avoids the renvoi problem. If
we suppose that the scope of State A law is a question of State A
law alone, then “State A law provides that State B law applies” is
simply not a well-formed proposition. Excising such statements
from the choice-of-law vocabulary prevents the paradox from
arising, and that excision is what the two-step model achieves.
There is, then, something to the idea that renvoi resembles
a problem of logic. It should make us question our premises, and
revise the one that produces the contradiction. But the analysis of
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this article has not proceeded as a matter of pure logic, and neither
is its conclusion put forth simply as a means to avoid paradox.
Instead, I have claimed as a constitutional matter that the power to
set the scope of a state law lies with that state and that state
alone.227 Renvoi is a logical problem that could only arise in a
legal system other than our own, and once the constitutional
allocation of power is understood, it disappears. 228
Choice of law, or a certain vision of it, disappears as well.
The conventional understanding of choice of law attributes to
states a power that the Constitution denies them. But giving up on
the idea that forum law can determine whether foreign law applies
is no sacrifice. It is, instead, the only way in which conflicts can
progress.

227

See supra text accompanying notes [] to [].
Thus the Constitution does not resolve the problem of renvoi in the
international setting. The basic idea that nation states are authoritative
interpreters of their own law occupies a similar fundamental place in
international law, however. As Chief Justice Marshall put it in Elmendorf v.
Taylor, 23 U.S (10 Wheat.) 152, 159-60 (1825), “no Court in the universe,
which professed to be governed by principle, would, we presume, undertake to
say, that the Courts of Great Britain, or of France, or of any other nation, had
misunderstood their own statutes, and therefore erect itself into a tribunal which
should correct such misunderstanding.” Understanding the nature of the
problem in the manner developed in this Article should allow resolution on that
basis.
228
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